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Abstract 
Share repurchase activity has grown significantly over the past twenty years and 
has emerged as the most popular technique for returning cash to shareholders. Current 
U.S. generally accepted accounting principles treat share repurchases as a return of 
capital to shareholders, recording the repurchased shares at market prices and offsetting 
them against contributed capital accounts.  This treatment reduces the recorded book 
value of the equity of companies.  Of course, companies can reissue these shares to fulfill 
stock option contracts, as consideration in acquisitions, and/or in secondary offerings. 
These economically relevant uses of repurchased shares suggest that the market may treat 
share repurchases differently than GAAP-based accounting. This study employs the 
Fama-French 3-Factor Model to test five potential views on repurchased shares: 1) a 
permanent return of capital to shareholders; 2) a prepaid cash expense related to stock-
options; 3) the monetization of internally generated goodwill; 4) a prepaid asset that can 
be used as consideration in a future acquisition; and 5) a put option on company shares. 
Results suggest that the current accounting treatment is as good or better than all other 
possibilities for diversified portfolios, but we do find support for other treatments in 
certain industries.   
Keywords: Share Repurchases, Stock Options, Dividends, Goodwill, Fama-French 3-
Factor Model, Book Value  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 “Buying back shares is the simplest and best way a company can reward its investors.” Peter Lynch 1990 
“It’s very politically correct to be against buybacks right now.” Warren Buffet May 2, 2020 
 Procter and Gamble (P&G) and Clorox are two consumer staple giants. Between 
2014-2018, these two companies had operating margins around 20%, adjusted net income 
grew marginally, and both paid out between 60%-70% of adjusted income in dividends. 
During this period, Clorox repurchased between 1-2% of weighted average shares each 
year, while P&G repurchased 2%-6% of its shares annually, resulting in substantial 
increases in treasury stock for both companies. By 2018, P&G’s book value was $55 
billion with $94 billion in treasury stock. Clorox reported book value of $726 million 
with $547 million of treasury stock. The reduction in the book values due to the share 
repurchases made these companies not comparable on a multiple basis, a traditional 
practitioner method of valuation, with P&G’s price to book fluctuating between 3x and 
4x earnings, while Clorox traded between 23x and 72x book value. (Bloomberg, 2020b).  
The United States’ economy grew from March 2009 to December 2019 with 
barely few disruptions (St. Louis Federal Reserve, 2020). During that time, profits 
generated by the S&P 500 grew at a compound annual growth rate of 9% (Bloomberg, 
2021a), and interest rates fell to record lows and remained relatively low throughout the 
expansion. The combination of high profits and historically low interest rates generated 
huge amounts of capital for companies to deploy.  Prominent among the financial 
strategies was the return of cash to shareholders via share repurchases and/or dividends. 
In 1997, share buybacks surpassed dividends as the most common strategy for returning 
cash to shareholders, and share buybacks continue to grow in value, frequency, and 
volume.  In 2019, the S&P 500 member companies conducted share repurchases totaling 
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$728.7 billion and paid dividends totaling $485.5 billion.  Thus, collectively the S&P 500 
returned $1.214 trillion to shareholders, which exceed the collective $1.158 trillion of 
earnings.  From 2014-2019, cash returned to shareholders (share repurchases + 
dividends) exceeded net income in four of the five years (Zeng & Luk, 2020). The Tax 
Cut and Jobs Act of 2017 accelerated the buyback trend. The volume was so high 
Goldman Sachs warned that the “buyback boom was getting out of hand,” as buybacks 
exceeded free cash flows (Egan, 2019).  
 
 Figure 1: “Aggregate Dividends and Buybacks Paid by U.S. Firms and the 
Percentage of Firms with Positive Dividend and Buybacks in the U.S. (Zeng & Luk, 
2020, p. 2) 
 
 
Historically, only distressed firms tended to report negative book values. Over the 
last ten years, that has changed. From 2014-2016 McDonald’s reduced its total equity 
from $12.8 billion to a negative $2.2 billion, despite earnings of more than $9 billion over 
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that period. The company chose to repurchase $16 billion of shares during these years in 
addition to its generous dividend policy (McDonald's Inc., 2020). As of April 6, 2021, 23 
firms in the S&P 500 reported negative book value at the end of their last fiscal year, but 
only three of these firms had a default probability above 1% and could be considered to 
be experiencing some financial distress duress (Bloomberg, 2021a).  
This shift in strong firms’ attitudes towards debt and negative book values raises 
questions about the relative effectiveness of some traditional financial valuation models 
in the new changed financial environment. Earlier in the 20th century, analysts widely 
applied the discounted dividends model.  However, this model was supplanted over the 
years as companies’ financial policies changed regarding the widespread payment of 
dividends. In 2019, Pinto, Robinson and Stowe found that 86.8% of equity analysts used 
a discounted cash flow approach to justify valuation, while only 35.1% continued to use a 
dividend discount model. Has the share buyback craze necessitated another such change?  
The same team found multiples are still the most popular valuation technique, but 
professionals heavily favor price to earnings (88.1%) and Enterprise Value (76.7%) based 
multiples over the more skewed book value-based models (59.0%). Analysts might need 
to adjust book values to bring these forms of valuation back in line with the financial 
engineering of modern Wall Street.  It is essential when screening for stocks.  For 
example, Fairchild (2018) showed a portfolio made up of all negative book value stocks 
from 1993-2018 outperformed the market, earning a 12.3% annualized return compared 
to the market’s 11.6%.  
Many multi-factor capital asset pricing models use reported book values. For 
example, the HML factor in Fama French’s 3 Factor Model (1992) is the basis of many 
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Wall Street firms’ alpha calculations, a metric used to determine mutual fund manager 
performance.1 Ma, Tang, and Gomez’s (2019) hand collected data show that 75% of 
mutual funds directly link their portfolio manager’s bonus to performance.    If 
repurchased shares skew the HML factor but are not adjusted in models, alpha values 
could be systematically overstated due to an incorrect assessment of risk (value vs. 
growth stocks), and they could be overcompensating their mutual fund managers.  
Treasury Stock 
When a corporation repurchases shares, it has two choices – retire the shares or 
hold the shares as treasury stock.  Treasury stock is reported as a negative component of 
stockholders’ equity on the balance sheet. As of April 12, 2021, 60% of the S&P 500 
companies held treasury stock (Bloomberg, 2021b). Of the S&P firms that repurchased 
shares in their last fiscal year, 75% held the shares in treasury (Bloomberg, 2021b). This 
preference is logical, as most companies use stock grants to compensate classes of 
employees, which is one possible use of treasury stock. However, most of these 
companies hold more treasury shares than they could practically issue as compensation. 
Reasons for doing so include having them for a possible secondary offering or funding 
future stock-based acquisitions. Many companies simply prefer the option of reissuing 
shares without seeking the Securities and Exchange Commission and shareholder 
approval. Managers appear to desire this financial flexibility, but how does the market 
value treasury stock? 
Alternative Accounting Treatments for Treasury Stock 
 
1 "The alpha of a stock is its expected return in excess of (or below) the fair expected return as predicted by 
the CAPM. If the stock is fairly priced, its alpha must be zero” (Bodie, Kane & Marcus, 2005, p.328). 
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Current U.S. accounting rules treat treasury stock transactions as a reduction in 
cash and a corresponding reduction in Shareholders’ Equity (FASB, 2020). This 
treatment was in place as early as 1919 when thought leaders of the day, including 
William Paton, opined that treasury stock was a reduction of equity, not an asset. Since 
the company retains the right to reissue these shares, this reduction in capital may be 
temporary or permanent. Walsh (1975) took an opposing view, suggesting that 
purchasing treasury stock is akin to an investment by a company in its stock. Van Horne 
(1971) countered Walsh, arguing that since treasury stock does not add to the earnings 
power of the company, it cannot be considered an investment.  Instead, it should be 
viewed as a financing decision. Each of these theoretical views has merit.  Which view 
does the market appear to adopt? 
There are five possible answers to the question of how the market implicitly treats 
treasury stock.   
 Repurchasing shares is a real return of equity capital and should be treated as a reduction 
in the reported book value of shareholders’ equity. 
 Repurchasing shares is at least in part prepaid compensation expense and should be 
reported as a prepaid asset as a result. 
 Repurchasing shares is the monetization of internally developed intellectual property and 
other intangible assets.  As such, it should be reported as an intangible asset on the 
balance sheet. 
 Repurchasing shares is a prepaid acquisition asset.  
 Holding treasury stock contains an inherent option to re-issue and the value of the option 
should be treated as an asset.  
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  Using these five methods, this author adjusted the book values of NYSE, AmEx 
and NASDAQ stocks used as inputs into Fama and French’s 3-Factor Model to explain 
equity returns. Assuming any level of the Efficient Market Hypothesis holds, the method 
with the greatest explanatory power reflects market participants’ collective view on the 
economic essence of repurchased shares. 
Research Contributions 
This study is relevant to multiple literatures. Within finance, it will contribute to the 
understanding of how the market interprets capital allocation decisions. Specifically, the 
findings could inform the value of share repurchases beyond their signaling power. It will 
also contribute to the asset pricing model literature.  From an accounting perspective, the 
results will inform literature regarding appropriate accounting for retired and treasury 
stock transactions and also potentially inform the literature on off-balance-sheet sources 
of value.  
For practitioners, the results of this research could create two primary benefits. The 
first is a deeper understanding of how the market interprets share buybacks, which can 
inform trading surrounding repurchase announcements or actions. The second would 
potentially be a small improvement in CAPM-based models that are often a source of 
alpha calculations used in compensation decisions.   
Market View of Share Repurchases  11 
Chapter 2: Literature Review 
 Several research streams address share repurchases. One stream is the role of 
share repurchases in financial policy.  This stream examines why companies repurchase 
shares rather than pay dividends or invest in growth, how they carry out the share 
repurchases, and what the company does with the repurchased shares.  A second stream 
examines the market impact of share repurchases – both as a signal of strong cash flows 
and the potential value creation/destruction related to the repurchase activity. As a part of 
this explanation, the impact share repurchases have on the book value, and the use of 
book value in asset pricing models must be considered. A third stream, especially 
relevant to this study, examines the theory underlying the optimal treatment of share 
repurchases.  Are share repurchases a return of capital, or a prepaid expense, or the 
monetization of intangible assets, or a prepaid acquisition, or an option, or something 
else? 
 Investors understand and weigh how, when, and why management decides to 
repurchase their shares. Additionally, since the stock market is forward looking, investors 
must also consider how the repurchased shares could be used. These general literature 
themes need to be explored to understand the market impact of share repurchases. 
 
Section 1: The Basics of Share Repurchases in the United States 
 Accounting Standards Codification Section 505 defines share repurchases as the 
act of a company buying its shares (FASB, 2020). The process of repurchasing shares 
includes three steps. First, the company must seek authorization. In the United States, a 
company may repurchase its shares with the approval of the board of directors 
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(McCarthy, 1999). In other countries like England, a shareholder vote is required for 
authorization to repurchase shares (Sonika, Carline, & Shackleton, 2014). There are no 
requirements for a company to announce the approval to its shareholders in the U.S. 
Second, once authorized, management may, or may not, choose to act on the 
authorization to repurchase shares. It may repurchase all, some, or none of the shares it 
was authorized to repurchase. To gain the safe harbor protection of S.E.C. Rule 10b-182, 
a company must announce the manner, price, timing, and volume of its execution in its 
annual 10-K and quarterly 10-Q filings (McCarthy, 1999). Third, once a share repurchase 
is completed, management must decide if the company will hold the shares in the form of 
treasury stock or cancel/retire the shares (FASB, 2020), a decision evident in the financial 
statements released to the market. 
  
 The Five Types of Share Repurchases 
 There are five methods generally utilized for repurchasing shares: fixed-price 
tender offers, Dutch auction tender offers, private market transactions, open market 
repurchase programs, or accelerated share repurchase programs.  
 A fixed-price tender offer states a single price, the number of shares sought, and 
the expiration date of the offer. Typically, the price is premium to the current market 
price to entice shareholders who are willing to sell to sign up for the offer rather than sell 
their shares in the open market. The company will purchase the stated number of shares, 
even if the offer is oversubscribed (Dann, 1981).  
 
2 Safe Harbor rules provide the repurchasing firm legal protections from stock price manipulation charges. 
For an analysis of compliance and impact see Cook, Krigman, and Leach (2003). 
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 A Dutch auction tender offer states a range of prices at which existing 
shareholders may sign up to sell their stock, the expiration date of the offer, and the 
number of shares sought in advance. The firm gathers all the minimum prices 
shareholders signed up to tender and ranks them from lowest to highest. The lowest price 
that will allow the company to repurchase the desired number of shares becomes the 
tender price. All sellers receive the tender price (including those who would have 
accepted a lower amount). The price ranges typically offered by Dutch auctions are a few 
percentage points higher than the current market price, to entice shareholders to tender, 
but the resulting tender price is usually lower than the fixed-price tender option 
(Comment & Jarrell, 1991).  
 Open market purchases require a company to hire an investment bank to 
repurchase shares through the secondary stock market, paying the market price at the 
time of purchase. Managers may instruct the firm to start and stop repurchasing shares at 
any given time without notifying investors and do not have to purchase the stated number 
of shares in the authorization. According to the S.E.C.’s data, “90% of all repurchase 
programs announced between 1985-1996 were to be conducted through open market 
transactions” (Ikenberry & Vermaelen, 1996, p. 10). 
 Private market transactions are typical in smaller market capitalization stocks. 
Large shareholders or former officers, who want to get rid of a large volume of stock, 
offer to sell it to the company. Due to the thinly traded nature of smaller-cap stocks, large 
shareholders often cannot exit significant positions quickly. Unlike the other forms of 
buybacks, privately negotiated transactions are typically at or near market price (Peyer & 
Vermaelen, 2005). One recent example was Wayside Technology WSTG, which agreed 
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to buy out their former C.E.O. (who was suing the company to try to take back control). 
The company repurchased the shares as a part of the out-of-court settlement agreement 
(Wayside Technology Group, 2020). 
 A more recent invention is the accelerated open market repurchase program. 
Here, an investment bank borrows a stated number of shares from investors (similar to a 
short sale), immediately removing the shares from the market. Then, over time, the 
investment bank repurchases the same number of shares in the open market and returns 
them to the investors who lent shares. The investment bank and the directing company 
share the gains or losses resulting from the timing difference. The result is an immediate 
reduction in the number of shares outstanding and a “hard” number of shares to be 
repurchased in the open market over time (Michel, Oded, & Shaked, 2010).  
 
Current Accounting for Repurchased Shares – Treasury Stock or Retiring Shares 
 Once repurchased, treasury shares may be held by the company or formally 
retired. Shares held in treasury have the status authorized and issued but not outstanding. 
Formally retired shares have the status authorized but not issued and, therefore, also not 
outstanding. Theoretically, management makes the hold in treasury versus retire decision 
based on its intent of how it plans to use the stock. If the company plans to reissue the 
shares for compensation or other uses, holding the shares in treasury is appropriate. If the 
company has no intention of using the shares again, then it can signal this to the market 
by retiring the shares. The net effect on assets (a reduction in cash) and Shareholders’ 
Equity is the same for either method. However, within shareholders’ equity, the treasury 
stock method creates a contra-equity account, while the retirement method reduces a 
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combination of common stock, paid-in capital, and retained earnings. All reductions are 
based on the market value of the shares repurchased (FASB, 2020).  
While the intent of the accounting for treasury stock is to create a temporary 
account, Banyi and Caplan (2016) found evidence that few Delaware-based public firms 
with treasury stock reduce their treasury stock holdings over time. Banyi and Caplan 
suggest that this temporary account is more permanent in practice. Additionally, they 
found that the average firm that uses treasury stock accounting issues new shares almost 
as often as those who retire shares – which is contradictory to expectations (Banyi & 
Caplan, 2016). 
Data from Bloomberg (2021b) shows that approximately 65% of firms of the S&P 
500 hold the repurchased shares in treasury rather than retiring the shares. Hill, Price, and 
Ruch (2018) suggest that there are practical reasons for the treasury stock method’s 
popularity. Until 2006, the New York Stock Exchange allowed firms to reissue treasury 
stock without shareholder approval (NYSE, 2020), making it easier to use than issuing 
new equity. Treasury stock is listed separately from retained earnings, which can affect 
some debt covenants that require companies to maintain a certain amount of “earned 
capital” (Duke & Hunt III, 1990). Additionally, Hill, Price, and Ruch (2018) find that 
firms are more likely to hold the shares in treasury and not retire them to avoid dropping 
retained earnings to a negative number. 
 
Why Share Repurchases and Not Dividends 
 Payout policy – the term used for the distribution of cash to shareholders either 
via dividends or repurchased shares – is a significant stream of literature in both 
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accounting and finance. The accounting for dividends and share repurchases have the 
same net effect on assets and total shareholders’ equity. So, how and why companies 
choose one of the alternatives or split between the two has been studied for more than 50 
years. While the evidence and market environment have changed, the underlying reasons 
have remained reasonably steady – management flexibility, tax advantages, earnings 
management, and debt covenants. 
 The Substitution Hypothesis argues that dividends and share buybacks are 
interchangeable in the eyes of management. Miller and Modigliani (1961) and Jensen 
(1986) provide the foundation for this hypothesis. Miller and Modigliani (1961) posit that 
dividend policy is irrelevant to the price of a stock. Using the assumptions of a perfect 
market and rational investors, Miller and Modigliani go through basic dividend discount, 
earnings and discounted cash flow models to show the dividend policy does not affect the 
value of the corporation. They go on to demonstrate that an investor should be indifferent 
to a dollar of capital gains and a dollar of dividend – pointing out many holders, like 
trusts, do not pay taxes. Consequently, Miller and Modigliani believe share repurchases 
and dividends are substitutes.  
 In 1986, Michael Jensen laid out his free cash flow theory that suggests excess 
cash flows create agency problems for management. Management must disgorge the 
excess cash flows by either paying dividends or repurchasing shares, as they are 
substitutes. Jensen, however, goes one step further and suggests companies should 
borrow money and repurchase shares – using future excess cash flows to service the new 
debt and thus reduce the temptation to invest future excess cash flows into money-losing 
diversification ventures. Jensen prefers the borrow/repurchase scenario over the higher 
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promised dividends because it is easier to cut a dividend than to issue shares to pay off 
debt. He suggests the repurchases are substitutes for dividends in the eyes of the 
corporation. 
 Not all scholars find the substitution theory acceptable. Fama and French (2001) 
suggested that dividend-paying companies repurchase shares as an additional distribution, 
rather than a substitution for dividends. Research shows there are several rational reasons 
why share repurchase growth has outstripped dividend growth over the past three decades 
and has exceeded total cash volume since 1997 (S&P Global, 2020).  
The first is management flexibility. In the United States, shareholders see the 
current level of dividends as a minimum payout forever (Brigham, 1964). When a firm 
cuts a dividend, the share price drops (e.g., Bessler & Nohel, 1996; Ghosh & Woolridge, 
1989; Pettit, 1972; Sonika et al., 2014; Zia & Kochan, 2017). However, the same is not 
true for share repurchases (Oded, 2005). Jagannathan, Stephens, and Weisbach (2000) 
found flexibility to be a significant reason why managers prefer share repurchases. Iyer 
and Rao (2017) used the 2008 financial crisis for data to test if share repurchase cuts were 
punished like dividends. They found that firms that cut repurchase activities performed 
better in the market than those who cut their dividends, lending strength to the concept 
that share repurchases offer more management flexibility. 
While investors require consistent or growing quarterly or annual dividends, what 
about special dividends? One-time or special dividends do not signal an annual 
commitment. However, there is evidence that investors start to anticipate special 
dividends if they become a regular source of capital return. For instance, Costco issued 
special dividends every nine quarters starting in 2012. When late 2019 came around, 
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professional investors and journalists wrote several pieces questioning where the special 
dividend was (e.g., Sparks, 2020). Consequently, this form of return to shareholders can 
create an implied contract, much like ordinary dividends.  
 Second, share repurchases offer a tax advantage to the shareholder, but not the 
corporation. The corporation must pay all dividends and share repurchases with after-tax 
dollars. One financial professional, Phil Guziac of Morningstar Inc., calls dividends the 
“unilateral imposition of a taxable event” (Phil Guziac, personal communication, June 1, 
2020). Dividends paid out, even if immediately re-invested in the company, are a taxable 
event in the year paid (Internal Revenue Service, 2020). Theoretically, share repurchases 
reward continuing shareholders through capital gains instead, which allow investors to 
delay the tax effects of the payout policy until they chose the sell the stock. The ability to 
delay recognizing tax is a significant reason why rational shareholders may prefer share 
repurchases over dividends (Elton & Gruber, 1968). This situation was obvious when 
capital gains were taxed at a much lower rate than dividends (Woods & Brigham, 1966). 
After qualified dividends and long-term capital gains were put on even footing under the 
Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, companies still favored share 
repurchases over dividends (Blouin, Raedy, & Shackelford, 2011) even though an 
updated preference of individuals is missing in the literature.  
 Third, there is evidence to suggest that managers engage in share repurchases as a 
form of real earnings management. When a company repurchases shares, the total 
number of shares decreases without affecting net income. Consequently, earnings per 
share3 grow faster than net income. For example, Home Depot’s net income grew 77% 
 
3 Earnings per share is defined as Net Income / Diluted Shares Outstanding 
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from 2014-2019, while EPS grew 117% over the same five-year period (Home Depot, 
2020). Hribar, Jenkins, and Johnson (2006) found evidence that share repurchase 
activities increased when net income would have failed to meet earnings estimates – 
suggesting repurchases are used in real earnings management. Burnett, Cripe, Martin, and 
McAllister (2012) supported earlier findings and found that when high-quality auditing 
prevents accrual-based earnings games, firms are also more likely to use accretive share 
repurchases to boost earnings. In a slightly different light, Cheng, Harford, and Zhang 
(2015) found that managers were more likely to buy back shares when their bonuses were 
tied to earning per share targets or growth. Additionally, there is evidence that managers 
increase share repurchases to offset the dilutive effect of stock option grants (Bens, 
Nagar, Skinner, & Wong, 2003). These four studies combine to support the notion that 
managers could favor share repurchases over dividends because of their ability to help 
manage earnings per share. 
 Finally, debt covenants restrict some firms from paying dividends or increasing 
their dividends but may allow firms to repurchase shares. Since both require a drain on 
cash and a reduction in total shareholders’ equity, this may seem strange. Investors 
recognized this disconnect, and it is changing. Billett, King, and Mauer (2007) studied 
15,504 debt issues from 1985 to 2003. The team found that while 25.8% of issues from 
1985-1989 had dividend restrictions, only 8.2% had share repurchase restrictions. As 
share repurchases became more popular, there was greater parity. By the 2000-2003 
period, only 16.9% of debt issuances had dividend payment restrictions, but 19.8% had 
share repurchase restrictions. So, while the likelihood is shrinking, debt covenants could 
explain some managers' preference of share repurchases to dividends.  
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 While the substitution theory expounded by Grullon and Michaely (2002), with 
roots back to Miller and Modigliani (1961) and Michael Jensen (1986), suggests 
dividends are share repurchases are substitutes for each other. We know that share 
repurchases have increased, and the propensity to pay dividends has declined (Fama & 
French, 2001). Extant literature points to four possible reasons why managers may favor 
share repurchases over dividends – flexibility, tax advantages, earnings management, 
and, to a much lesser extent, debt covenants. 
 
The Uses of Repurchased Shares 
 With the propensity to repurchase shares established, the next avenue to explore is 
what the firm does with the repurchased shares. Firms can retire the shares, hold the 
shares indefinitely, reissue the shares for compensation, reissue shares as a part of a 
stock-based acquisition, reissue shares as a part of a stock dividend or reissue the shares 
in a seasoned equity offering.  
 Firms can choose to retire shares repurchased. State laws can influence this 
decision by forcing companies to use the retirement method. For example, Massachusetts, 
Maryland, California, Georgia, Oregon, and Washington, prohibit the use of treasury 
stock, effectively requiring a firm to retire the shares upon purchase (Banyi & Caplan, 
2016). Other firms hold treasury shares for a while and then choose to retire some or all 
of the shares. Hill et al. (2018) showed that firms were less likely to retire shares if share 
retirement resulted in negative retained earnings. In the same vein, but outside of the 
United States, Latif, Mohd, and Kamardin’s (2015) study of Malaysian firms found that 
smaller companies and those whose profitability is increasing are more likely to retire 
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treasury stock. Once retired, the same shares may not be reissued. However, new shares 
can be created and issued, resulting in virtually the same outcome. 
 While the treasury stock account is supposed to hold share costs until they are 
either reissued or retired, there is evidence that corporations retain a certain level of 
repurchased shares without retiring the shares (Banyi & Caplan, 2016). If held forever, 
the result is the same as retiring the shares, but the financial statements will differ under 
the two approaches. The net effect is a permanent return of capital to shareholders (Paton, 
1969).  
 One of the most popular uses of treasury stock is to reissue the shares as a part of 
stock option or restricted stock grants. As stock options became a more popular form of 
compensation in the 1990s, share repurchase activity also increased. Kahle (2002) found 
a positive relationship between the size of share repurchases and the number of 
exercisable options in a company. Bens, Nagar, Skinner, and Wong (2003) found that 
share repurchases are tied to the issuing, not exercising of stock option grants. The 
authors concluded that managers engaged in share repurchases not to provide shares for 
the option grants, but to manage diluted earnings per share. Weisbenner (2000), Lee and 
Alam (2004) and Lin, Yu-Chen, You and Cheng (2009) found similar earning 
management results but found that exercisable (not already exercised) options had the 
greatest explanatory power of share repurchase activities. All three authors stated that 
managers were likely motivated by a desire not to let total shares outstanding grow. The 
popularity of stock options and the volume of shares issued through this form of 
compensation accounts for about half of all shares repurchased (Liang & Sharpe, 1999). 
Bonaimé, Kahle, Moore, and Nemani (2019) show that the shift to restricted stock grants 
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rather than options has not altered the positive relationship between the equity grants and 
stock repurchases.  
 Firms may also issue treasury stock to an Employee Stock Ownership Plan 
(ESOP) Trust. In this case, the company encourages its employees to purchase stock in 
the company, either as a succession planning move for a small business, or a retirement 
savings plan (Gordon & Pound, 1990). The tax advantages of using ESOPs are not as 
good when using treasury stock for funding; using cash and debt would be more tax 
advantageous for the firm. Additionally, the company would avoid having to pay 
dividends on the treasury stock if they used the cash/debt approach for funding (Freiman, 
1990). 
 When a company completes an acquisition, part or all of the consideration 
rendered for the target shares may be shares in the acquiring company (i.e., a stock 
swap). The shares swapped during acquisition can be newly authorized shares (usually a 
part of the acquisition approval process) or can be shares previously held as treasury 
stock. Paton (1969) suggests there is minimal difference between treasury stock and 
newly created issues. Thus, using shares from treasury should serve as a convenient and 
inexpensive source of shares. Interestingly, Jenkins and Ovtchinnikov (2010) found a 
significant difference. Firms purchased with newly issued shares saw their stock price 
decrease as the market took it as a signal of over-valuation of the stock. Firms paying in 
cash, with treasury stock, or a combination of treasury stock and cash did not see the 
same drop in the share price. This suggests that the market equates the use of treasury 
stock much closer to the use of cash in acquisitions than newly issued shares. Like stock 
options, this remains a widespread use of treasury stock. In 2006, Senior Index Analyst 
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Howard Silverblatt said, “S&P believes that the greatest use [of repurchased shares] will 
be for M&A” (Jenkins & Ovtchinnikov, 2010, p. 2). 
 Companies may use treasury stock for stock or scrip dividends. Stock dividends 
are no longer popular in the U.S., as it is more of a small stock split than a return of 
capital to shareholders. Some firms still argue that stock dividends are a useful tool. By 
issuing a stock dividend, the firm keeps its per-share price lower. Additionally, many 
recipients of the stock dividend will sell off the newly acquired shares to other investors 
to get cash, hypothetically increasing the number of shareholders in the firm. Combining 
the lower per-share price and a broader shareholder base, managers argue they will find it 
easier to float new sales of equity to the market used to seeing new shares (Eisemann & 
Moses, 1978). Scrip dividends are not precisely the same as stock dividends, as scrip 
dividends give the investor a choice between a cash dividend or a similar value in stock. 
This results in something closer to a small IPO rather than a stock split. Scrip dividends 
are a use of treasury stock but are not available in the United States. Research in the 
U.K., found scrip dividends do not save taxes, signal future prospects, or improve cash 
flow (Lasfer, 1997a). Scrip dividends are also not considered substitutes for cash 
dividends (Lasfer, 1997b), suggesting that they are also not a good use of treasury stock.  
 Finally, companies can reissue treasury stock in a seasoned equity offering. While 
transactions in a company’s own shares will never result in a profit impact (Brigham, 
1964), the acquisition of its shares and subsequent reissue of the shares creates an 
opportunity for a company to buy low and sell high. However, there is little evidence of a 
company’s actual ability to generate profits this way. There does appear though to be 
some benefits to repurchasing shares and then reissuing them. Bond and Zhong (2016) 
Market View of Share Repurchases  24 
found that when companies engage in a seasoned equity offering, the price of the stock 
does not drop as much when the company had previously repurchased its shares than 
when it had not. The subsequent performance of the stock does not result in any abnormal 
return (Abdou & Gupta, 2019).  
 With a variety of methods to buy, report, and use share repurchases, forward-
looking investors should weigh the likelihood of each when determining a market impact 
of a share repurchase. This study will investigate if adjusting the book value to reflect the 
various uses is mirrored in the movements of the stock price. 
 
Section 2: The Market Impact of Share Repurchases 
 The finance and accounting literatures include much research related to the 
market impact of share repurchases.  The literatures have identified several sources of 
market impact including market signaling, market timing, the relationship between share 
repurchases and insider trading, and the subsequent market performance of firms after 
announcing and executing a share repurchase plan. 
 
Signaling in Share Repurchases 
 In 1977, Stephen Ross was one of five scholars (Bhattacharya, 1979; Brealey, 
Leland, & Pyle, 1977) who postulated that since firm insiders possess more knowledge 
than outsiders, financial structure decisions act as a signal to the market that the firm is 
undervalued. This signaling theory was quickly applied to share repurchases. Vermaelen 
(1981) found a positive relationship between the size of the buybacks and the increase in 
share price on the day of the announcement. Dann (1981) found share price increases the 
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day share repurchase plans are announced.  This benefits current shareholders as the 
announcement (compared to the act) signals undervaluation. A decade later, Comment 
and Jarrell (1991) compared three methods of share repurchases – Open Market, Dutch 
auction, and Fixed-Price Tender offers. They found the fixed-price tender offer 
announcement gave the strongest positive signal to the market, resulting in the largest 
return the day it was announced. The results are logical and consistent with signaling 
theory, as a fixed-price tender offer is the only one that gives a firm price the company is 
willing to repurchase shares at – lending insight into the firm’s self-valuation. Fixed-
priced tender offers had a median 16% premium over pre-announcement price, while 
Dutch auction offers result in a median 12.5% premium (Ikenberry & Grullon, 2000). 
Dutch auctions provide a stronger signal to the market than open market repurchase 
plans, which have no incremental pricing disclosure beyond the current market price 
(Comment & Jarrell, 1991).  
  Open market offers may be weakest because of fear of completion. Firms can 
announce share repurchase plans, but then not execute them (Ikenberry & Vermaelen, 
1996). Bonaimé (2012) found that firms can create a reputation for either completing or 
not completing their announced repurchase plans. When firms do not reliably use their 
announced authorization, the signaling power of a new announcement is significantly 
weaker than firms with a history of completion. However, firms worried about their prior 
signaling can announce an accelerated share repurchase plan to mitigate the completion 
fear and strengthen the signal of the repurchase announcement (Bonaimé, 2012).  
 Whatever repurchase method a company chooses, there has been consistent 
evidence that merely the announcement of a repurchase plan – the signal that the firm 
Market View of Share Repurchases  26 
believes its shares are a bargain – is enough to move the stock price up the day it is 
released. Open market program day-of returns average between 2% and 4%, depending 
on the period measured (Grullon & Michaely, 2002, 2004). Fixed price tender-offers 
result in excess stock returns of 11% around the three days of and after the 
announcement, while Dutch auction offers result in an 8% excess return (Comment & 
Jarrell, 1991). 
 
Market Timing of Share Repurchases 
 Moving beyond the announcement, the next question to answer is, do managers 
time the market when making their share repurchases? Brav, Graham, Harvey, and 
Michaely’s (2005) survey showed that 80% of corporations initiate a share repurchase 
plan when they believe the stock is a good investment compared to alternatives, 
suggesting market timing. Ikenberry and Vermaelen (1996) argued that managers 
repurchase their stock when it is undervalued and would refuse to repurchase shares 
when their stock is overvalued, again suggesting that managers can time the market. 
Assuming the managers can time the market, then each company should be able to earn 
abnormal returns following the share repurchase as the market corrects the mispricing. 
Note, these articles were published prior to the major stock repurchase booms of recent 
years.  More recent findings are mixed, with Gunn (2017) finding only small and mid-
sized firms show evidence of positive timing, while large firms do not. 
 However, Fama (1998), Brav and Gompers (1997), and Mitchell and Stafford 
(2000) suggest that the methodology employed by researchers like Ikenberry and 
Vermaelen (1996) is flawed. These papers concluded there are problems with appropriate 
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benchmarks and how to measure the abnormal return required to show market timing can 
be misleading. Additionally, Schultz (2003) hypothesized the existence of pseudo-market 
timing concerning I.P.O.s but could also exist for share repurchases. Pseudo-market 
timing is the appearance of market under/over-performance after a corporate finance 
decision because managers base their decisions on past stock market performance. The 
evidence of market timing disappears when calendar-time returns replace event-time 
methods (Schultz, 2003). Following Schulz’s hypothesis, Chan, Ikenberry, and Lee 
(2007) used calendar-time methodology and continued to find evidence of actual market 
timing and no evidence of pseudo-market timing. 
 
The Link Between Share Repurchases and Insider Trading 
 Based on the idea that managers time the market when repurchasing shares and 
can use the same knowledge when trading the same stock for their portfolio. It would 
seem logical to find a significant link between insider trading and share repurchase 
activity. Nevertheless, Chan, Ikenberry, Lee, and Wang (2012) found that insiders were 
more likely to sell after announcing a repurchase program, even after controlling for 
option-related selling. Bonaimé and Ryngaert (2013) confirmed that the results in the 
other direction; the odds of high net repurchases are greater when insiders are selling, not 
buying stocks. These conflicting signals result in mixed messaging for the market and 
result in the market ignoring the positive signaling of the share repurchases. However, 
when both insiders and the firm are net buyers (resulting in two signals, both suggesting 
the stock is undervalued), the signal is powerful. It results in significantly higher returns 
in the quarter of the repurchase activity and the following three years.  
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Both studies above looked at simultaneous signals. Cziraki, Lyandres, and 
Michaely (2019) studied insider trading and share repurchases on a lagged basis and 
discovered that insiders tend to be net buyers before open market repurchase plans are 
announced, and net sellers before seasoned equity offerings (which typically drive the 
stock price down) are announced. Babenko, Tserlukevich, and Vedrashko (2012) found 
that when C.E.O.s purchase stock before announcing an open market share repurchase 
program, the signaling power of the program announcement is more robust, resulting in a 
larger bump to share price.  
 
Post-Repurchase Firm Performance 
 Having looked at market returns on the day-of announcement (signals) and when 
executed (market timing), researchers have also studied the long-term effects of share 
repurchases on firm performance. There have been two main definitions of performance 
– operating performance measured in various income statement related metrics and 
market performance measured as cumulative abnormal stock returns.  
 Operationally, share repurchases allow earnings per share to grow faster than net 
income, creating the “EPS bump” (Ikenberry & Grullon, 2000). An EPS bump assumes 
that whatever funding mechanism it uses (idle cash or borrowings) does not decrease 
earnings a larger percentage than the share count falls. While this does not improve 
operations, it may affect the share price, assuming a constant multiple (Ikenberry & 
Grullon, 2000).  
A popular metric to judge abnormal operational returns is increases in return on 
assets. There are two hypotheses related to improved return on assets. First, using excess 
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cash to repurchase stock puts an idle or under-performing asset to use in its highest return 
(Wansley, Lane, & Sarkar, 1989), reducing total assets while not impacting net income, 
resulting in a higher return on assets. The second hypothesis is that management 
purposefully manipulates earnings before the share repurchase. By using excess accruals, 
management can temporarily reduce operating profit before the repurchase 
announcement, only to show improvement after the announcement. Gong, Louis, and Sun 
(2008) found evidence of abnormal accruals the quarter-before and quarter-of a new 
repurchase plan announcement, which resulted in post-repurchase operational 
improvement in the one and two-year periods when the accruals reverted to normal 
levels. Chen and Huang (2013) looked at similar evidence five years later and determined 
Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) was able to limit this management manipulation. Using a long-
term data set divided into Pre- and Post-SOX, the duo confirmed Gong et al.’s results for 
Pre-SOX manipulation, but saw the abnormal accruals disappear Post-SOX. 
Long-term firm outperformance due to share repurchases has been a hotly 
contested set of finance literature over the past 30 years. The idea of cumulative 
abnormal returns (C.A.R.) goes against the Efficient Market Hypothesis (Peyer & 
Vermaelen, 2009). Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen (1995) found not only an 
initial bump in the stock price after open market repurchases discussed earlier (signaling) 
but a lasting effect. Firms who repurchased shares reported abnormal stock returns of 
2.9% annually over the four years following the announcements. Using Fama and 
French’s Book-to-Market ratio as a proxy, the authors found that value stocks earned a 
6.4% annual abnormal return over four-year periods. The same researchers followed up 
their study five years later (Ikenberry, Lakonishok, & Vermaelen, 2000) with new data 
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(1990s Canadian data vs. 1980s U.S. data) and came to similar conclusions. Other 
researchers have found similar supporting evidence (e.g., Gong et al., 2008; Lie, 2005; 
Peyer & Vermaelen, 2005). Using a different metric (buy and hold returns vs. C.A.R.), 
Chan et al. (2007) also found abnormal performance for up to four years after repurchase 
announcements using data that spanned 1980 to 1990.  
 In 2009, Peyer and Vermaelen re-tested the evidence from above to see if it 
persists as Efficient Market Hypothesis proponents suggest that anomalies should 
disappear after they are well-advertised. Additionally, they calculated the outperformance 
metrics three different ways to address concerns that C.A.R. and Buy and Hold metrics 
were fundamentally flawed. They found continued support that before repurchase 
announcements, stock prices are un-justifiably beat down and that management takes 
advantage of this relative underpricing when repurchasing shares. Using data from 1991 
to 2001, they find cumulative abnormal returns of 24.25% after four years. Peyer and 
Vermaelen found that with alternative measures, like calendar-weighted results, the 
outperformance decreases somewhat, but remained statistically significant and positive. 
 McNally and Smith (2007) also confirmed the cumulative abnormal returns for 
firms who repurchased shares in the Canadian market but found that when adding in 
transaction costs, individual investor trading strategies did not yield abnormal returns. 
The two found median abnormal returns of the firm’s actions of 3.31% after one year and 
4.22% after two years but found when an individual attempted to capture the same 
additional returns by purchasing shares immediately after the announcement; transaction 
costs ate up enough of the return to wipe out the excess return. 
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 All the previously discussed returns are based on open market repurchase plans. 
Michel et al. (2010) looked specifically at post-repurchase market performance for the 
increasingly popular accelerated stock repurchase method. They did not find the same 
post-repurchase price drift as earlier researchers did for other forms of repurchasing. 
Using 15 days post announcement to 9 months later, the average C.A.R. was -8.5% 
relative to its value on Day 15 after the announcement, using data from 2004-2007, 
suggesting value destruction.  
 Finally, Abdou and Gupta (2019) explored whether the announced purpose of the 
share buyback would affect the cumulative abnormal return. The team ended up finding it 
did not. Interestingly, they also found that all repurchase techniques (open market, fixed-
price tender, Dutch auction, or accelerated repurchase), negatively contributed to 
cumulative abnormal returns when controlling for company size, risk, and revenue. It is 
unclear if the efficient market has finally eliminated the excess return from earlier data 
sets or prior research confused correlation with causation.  
 While the theories about the how and the why are mixed and the size of the 
impact have potentially changed, adding up all the research suggests that the growing 
share repurchase activity does impact accounting metrics and share price.  
 
Section 3: The Role of Book Value Per Share in Firm Valuation Models 
 The number of shares outstanding and book value of a company are factors in 
most models of firm value and market performance. Since share repurchases affect the 
reported diluted shares outstanding and book value of the corporation, we must 
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understand the role of book value per share in these models to understand the impact 
share repurchase accounting and activities have on theory and practice. 
 
Capital Structure on the Value of the Firm 
In 1958, Modigliani and Miller (M&M) published their widely cited theorem that 
capital structure is irrelevant to the value of the firm. The underlying assumptions 
allowed for a simplified theory (i.e., no transaction costs and that individuals and 
corporations can borrow at the same cost). Consequently, various capital structure 
theories emerged to adjust M&M’s theory to include the impact of taxes related to debt 
and equity securities at the individual and corporate levels (e.g., Modigliani, 1982), the 
cost of financial distress (e.g., Kim, 1978; Scott Jr, 1977), agency costs (e.g., Jensen & 
Meckling, 1979) and tax shields on non-interest items like accelerated depreciation (e.g., 
DeAngelo & Masulis, 1980). Bradley, Jarrell, and Kim (1984) combined these items to 
support Trade-Off Theory. They conclude optimal debt levels – those that will maximize 
the value of the firm -- increase as the cost of financial distress (both agency and 
bankruptcy risk) decreases. Optimal leverage is also inversely related to the amount of 
non-debt tax shields. Managers must balance the risk of financial distress with the tax 
savings of additional debt. However, Trade-Off Theory does not appear to hold over 
extended periods. For example, the theory would suggest that as the cost of financial 
distress increases, debt would fall. However, long-run leverage ratios have been mostly 
static from 1900 to 2002, despite swings in economic health and cost of bankruptcy and 
debt (Frank & Goyal, 2008).  
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 An alternative to Trade-Off Theory is the Pecking Order Theory (Myers & 
Majluf, 1984). This theory suggests that debt is issued (increasing leverage) due to 
internal cash demands that cannot be met by internally generated cash and because it is 
cheaper than equity. Pecking Order Theory states that immediate internal concerns, rather 
than a goal of an elusive optimal debt ratio, drive capital structure. Shyam Sunder and 
Myers (1999) demonstrate that the Pecking Order Theory appears to explain corporate 
actions better when a financial deficit is present than Trade-Off Theory. However, the 
theory can break down, and analysts can reject it when firms choose to issue equity over 
debt, which happens frequently (Frank & Goyal, 2003).  
 Since both significant theoretical streams have short comings, there is no unifying 
capital structure theory that can explain all firm actions. While imperfect, both conclude 
that capital structure can impact the value of the firm. To adjust capital structure quickly, 
a firm can issue or pay off debt, or issue or buy back shares. Consequently, one can 
assume that share buybacks, which alter the leverage ratio, will impact the value of the 
firm due to the impact on the capital structure of the firm. 
 
Capital Asset Pricing Models 
 There are dozens of theoretical models for valuation. They generally fall into a 
couple of categories – discounted flows-based models (discounted dividends, discounted 
free cash flows, and discounted abnormal earnings), multiples-based models (price as a 
multiple of accounting measures including but not limited to earnings, book value, 
EBITDA, and revenues), and capital asset pricing models. Number of shares outstanding 
and/or book values are critical to the output of all of these models, and their estimates of 
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value will be highly correlated. This dissertation focuses on capital asset pricing models 
because of their wide acceptance as theoretical pricing models and their use of market-
driven valuation in conjunction with some accounting to obtain a return.  
Sharpe-Lintner-Black CAPM 
 The most high-profile pricing model is the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). 
This model was developed by Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965), and Black (1972). The 
model, shown below, assumes individual corporate returns are a function of their risk 
relative to the overall market (Bodie, Kane, & Marcus, 2005)4.  
rjt – rft = αj + βjt(rmt – rft)+ϵjt 
The impact of share repurchases is not readily apparent in the CAPM model in its 
original form. When share repurchases are used to change the capital structure of the 
company, however, the risk level of equity compared to the market will change, which 
will affect the beta of the CAPM formula.  
Fama-French 3-Factor Model 
Fama and French (1993) presented a 3-Factor version of CAPM to enhance its 
explanatory power, displayed below.  
 
The original beta on the market risk premium was maintained. The SMB term represents 
small-minus-big (the difference in monthly average returns of small companies based on 
market capitalization to large companies based on market cap). This factor compensates 
for the size effects witnessed in the market. According to Fama and French (1995), small 
 
4 For an explanation of the inputs, mechanics, and uses of CAPM, see Bodie, Kane and Marcus (2005). 
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firms in the 1980s showed lower returns on assets than large firms, even when controlling 
for other factors. Consequently, small firms must share some common risk factor that 
adds explanatory power of their stock returns.  
 The second new factor was high-minus-low (HML). Firms with high book value 
to market value of equity have a low stock price relative to their book value per share. 
This lower stock price reflects lower earnings expectations on the book equity (Fama & 
French, 1995). On the flip side, low BE/ME firms have higher earnings power on their 
book equity. In short, low BE/ME firms tend to be growth stocks while high BE/ME 
firms are often financially distressed firms (Fama & French, 1995) or value firms (Davis, 
Fama, & French, 2000).  
Note that Fama and French (1992) stated: “We do not use negative-BE firms, 
which are rare before 1980, when calculating the breakpoint for BE/ME or when forming 
the size-BE/ME portfolios” (p.8), later stating these firms show signs of financial distress 
(Fama & French, 1995). This omission is critical, as more and more companies have low 
or negative shareholders’ equity as a result of share repurchases and are not financially 
distressed. Indeed, it is the opposite in several cases. The negative book value firms are 
firms that have used significant positive cash from operations over several years to buy 
back shares. As of April 6, 2021, applying Fama and French’s Model using their 
methodology will exclude 23 members of the S&P 500 (Bloomberg, 2021a), and 
potentially reduce its explanatory power. Considering Fama and French (2004) state that 
the HML factor “does the heavy lifting in the improvements to the CAPM” (p.40), the 
potential reduction in its explanatory power is problematic.  
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The application and explanatory power of the Fama-French Model, when applied 
in the original method, is robust. In 1993, Fama and French reported R2 ranging from 
0.82 to 0.97 depending on the portfolio measured when looking at U.S. Stocks from July 
1963 to December 1991. In 2000, Davis, Fama, and French use the Model on NYSE 
listed stocks and compared periods between July 1929 and June 1997. The results show 
that the 3-Factor Model has an R2 between 0.90 and 0.98, depending on the period and 
portfolio. In yet another test on North American stocks from November 1990 to March 
2011, the R2 continued to be a strong 0.93 when regressed against only local factors 
(Fama & French, 2012). This consistently strong result suggests the 3-Factors do help 
explain price volatility. However, the impact of the rapidly changing book values per 
share due to share repurchases has yet to be explored, and the possible adjustments 
outlined below may bring the Model even stronger results. 
 
Section 4: Five Views of Repurchased Shares  
 The generally accepted accounting treatment for share repurchases and treasury 
stock has been mostly stable for several decades. However, historically there was some 
variation. According to Fjeld (1936), 221 of the 404 NYSE listed firms with treasury 
stock in 1932 classified at least part of their holdings as assets. This practice was partially 
a strategy to avoid the reduction in shareholders’ equity (Rueschhoff, 1978). The current 
treatment was driven by the U.S. Internal Revenue Service (I.R.S.) as much as the 
financial accounting regulators. The I.R.S. decided on the current accounting method that 
treats share repurchases as a return on capital. In 1933, the I.R.S. changed its rules and 
suggested that any difference in price between the purchase and sale of treasury stock 
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was income to the corporation. This rule resulted in most companies retiring their 
treasury stock and merely issuing new shares when needed, no longer labeling the 
repurchased shares as assets. Twenty years later, the I.R.S. reversed its stance and 
stopped labeling the reissue as income, but verified it was an owner’s equity transactions, 
which mainly stuck. By 1975, only 5 of 600 companies accounted for treasury shares – 
specifically for the reissue related to stock options – as an asset (Rueschhoff, 1978). 
Today, share repurchases, retired or held as treasury stock, are considered a reduction in 
shareholders’ equity.  
 
Share Repurchases are a Return of Capital 
 Paton argued that share repurchases are a return of capital to shareholders as early 
as 1919, but he addressed the issue again 50 years later (Paton, 1969). Paton posits that 
repurchased shares are economically equivalent to shares that have never been issued. 
Even when ultimately reissued, there is no meaningful difference to newly created shares. 
Repurchased shares have no voting rights or dividend rights – the same as authorized, but 
not issued shares. The accounting for both should be consistent. Paton rejected the notion 
that there is any asset value to be shown on the balance sheet related to the option to 
reissue by pointing out that it is equivalent to a bank line of credit that a company can 
establish. The potential cash from a bank line of credit does not appear until the company 
draws on the line; the same should be true for repurchased shares.  
 Assuming repurchased shares are a return on capital also evens the playing field 
between treasury and retired shares. While individual line items vary, the net effect on 
total assets and total shareholders’ equity remains the same between retired shares and 
Market View of Share Repurchases  38 
treasury shares (Banyi & Caplan, 2016). As a company retains the right to reissue 
treasury shares or issue new shares to replace the retired shares, this consistent 
accounting of equivalent maneuvers is optimal.  
 Finally, share repurchases are viewed as substitutes for dividends as both are a use 
of cash that goes directly to shareholders (Grullon & Michaely, 2002). This rationale 
supports the existing accounting methodology and leads to the first hypothesis. 
 
H1: The market treats share repurchases as a return of capital to shareholders, such 
that the current accounting methods without adjustment will have the greatest 
explanatory power in the Fama-French 3-Factor Model. 
 
Share Repurchases are a Prepaid Cash Expense 
 The basic definition of an asset in accounting is “probable future economic 
benefits obtained or controlled by a particular entity as a result of past transactions or 
events” (Weygandt, Kimmel, & Kieso, 2015, p. 48). Share repurchases bought with the 
intent to reissue as a form of compensation fits this definition. Companies control 
treasury shares after using cash (a past transaction) and expect to economically benefit 
the corporation in the form of the efforts and retention of the employees paid via stock.  
 It is the intent of management that makes the acquisition of shares an asset 
(Horwitz & Young, 1975). Equity compensation is also a significant use of the 
repurchased form. Liang and Sharpe (1999) estimated that about half of repurchased 
shares are reissued for stock options. As stated earlier, Bonaimé et al. (2019) show that 
the shift to restricted stock grants rather than options has not altered the positive 
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relationship between the equity grants and stock repurchases. Consequently, this portion 
of share repurchases bought with the intent to reissue as compensation appear to meet the 
AICPA’s rules surrounding assets.  
 Accounting for stock options is a complicated issue (Hall, 2000). Stock option 
expense is a non-cash charge based on the Black-Scholes-Merton or Lattice option 
pricing model (Baril, Betancourt, & Briggs, 2007). It is reversed in adjustments in cash 
flow from operations because it is a non-cash expense in that period (Weygandt et al., 
2015). However, most companies use cash to buy back shares and then award at least a 
portion of those treasury shares to their employees. Bens et al. (2003) found the market 
impact of shares repurchased to fulfill employee stock options occur when the stock 
options are issued to the employee rather than when the options are exercised by the 
employee. Hence, the market assigns a high probability to their ultimate exercise. There 
is a real cash outlay behind the expense. The fact that these are two separate transactions 
does not negate the real cash outflow. By reversing the “non-cash” charge for stock 
option expense and instead recognizing the cash outlay and accompanying inflow from 
exercise in cash flow from financing, existing accounting overstates both cash flow from 
operations and free cash flow. Kahle (2002) found evidence that the market reacts less 
favorably to share repurchase announcements when a company has a large volume of 
stock options outstanding – a signal that the market may see through the accounting. 
 To adjust for the cash nature of stock compensation, analysts can make the 
following adjustments. First, the portion of share repurchases that offset stock grants 
could be moved from a negative contra-equity account to an asset account – current or 
long-term depending on expiration, at cost. This adjustment would effectively raise book 
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value of equity temporarily until the real expense is recognized through in the income 
statement – which will eventually flow into retained earnings. These adjustments are not 
a part of existing accounting but may reflect how the market thinks about share 
repurchases.  
 
H2: The market treats share repurchases as a pre-paid cash expense, such that 
recording repurchased shares as an asset valued at the net cash of unexercised stock 
options, with a corresponding increase to book value will have the greatest explanatory 
power in the Fama-French 3-Factor Model. 
 
Repurchasing Shares is the Monetization of Internally Generated Goodwill 
 When initially justifying the asset treatment of treasury stock, Bentley (1911) and 
Montgomery (1912) noted that the transactions required firms to spend cash for an object 
that could be sold (had monetary value) or retained by the firm at the firm’s option. Since 
there was real value related to the repurchased share, it was viewed as an asset (Sheldahl, 
1982). This treatment was popular until the 1930s when legal restrictions were put in 
place that limited distributions beyond current retained earnings (Rueschhoff, 1978). This 
notion generally did not find favor with the accounting profession (Paton, 1969).  
Behind the idea that a repurchased share has value is the assumption that the 
company is a going concern with a profitable future. The company merely decides the 
best use of its money is not to buy a new piece of equipment or hire a new employee, but 
to invest it into its stock, similar to any other acquisition (Paton, 1969). If one looks at a 
repurchased share as a partial acquisition of itself, several interesting implications arise. 
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The most significant implication is the potential to recognize goodwill. Internally 
generated intangible assets are not capitalized under generally accepted accounting 
principles. Only when a company is sold will identified intangible assets be written up to 
their fair value and/or goodwill be recognized. Each are part of the cost basis of the 
acquiring company (Weygandt et al., 2015). In a sign of recognizing that goodwill can, in 
many instances, have an indefinite useful life, the FASB discontinued the amortization of 
goodwill in 2001 (Statement 142, 2020). 5 Goodwill and appreciated intangible assets 
(e.g., Sinclair & Keller, 2014; Corrado, Hulten & Sichel, 2009), are not reported on the 
balance sheet. But, when a company repurchases its shares, it is acquiring a small portion 
of a going concern – a partial acquisition, usually at a value higher than book value. 
Corrado, Hulten, and Sichel (2009) posit that unrecognized goodwill meets all the criteria 
of intangible capital – since it was created through investment to yield future returns. A 
share repurchase is thus a combination of a return of accounting recognized capital (book 
value) to shareholders and a related recognition of internally generated goodwill (Zhang, 
2013). As with other forms of goodwill, the new intangible asset is subject to impairment 
tests and should be written-off when its fair value is less than its value in the financial 
statements.  
 
H3: The market views share repurchases as a de facto partial acquisition of the firm 
and the monetization of internally generated goodwill such that the adjustment is the 
recognition of the cost of repurchased shares in excess of the book value as an 
 
5 The adoption and procedures in SFAS 142 resulted from a significant amount of political influence on the 
independent accounting standards setting board. For a good review of the background related to this 
standard see Ramanna (2008).  
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intangible subject to impairment testing.  H3 posits that this adjustment will have the 
greatest explanatory power in the Fama-French 3-Factor Model. 
 
Repurchasing Shares is a Prepaid Cash Acquisition Asset 
 In 1975, Horwitz and Young argued that the intent of management should be 
considered when determining the accounting treatment of share repurchases. One 
intended use of repurchased shares is the acquisition of other companies. Exxon Mobil 
has explicitly stated such an intent, buying shares over the years, storing them in treasury 
stock, and then reissuing them when it finds an attractive acquisition (Sanati, 2009). 
Evidence shows that the market treats acquisitions made with treasury shares like cash 
rather than stock-based acquisitions (Jenkins & Ovtchinnikov, 2010). With this economic 
equivalency to cash, shares repurchased for the intent to reissue to acquire another 
company should be treated as a cash equivalent.  
 
H4: The market views share repurchases as a prepaid acquisition, such that recording 
repurchased shares as a cash equivalent asset of the firm, with a corresponding 
increase to book value will have the greatest explanatory power in the Fama-French 3-
Factor Model. 
 
Treasury Stock is a Put Option on Company Shares  
 Until retired, companies can reissue treasury shares for a variety of purposes, 
including compensation, acquisition, and seasoned equity offerings, most of which are at 
or near current market value (Bond & Zhong, 2016; Jenkins & Ovtchinnikov, 2010; 
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Liang & Sharpe, 1999). In other words, the company has the economic equivalent of a 
put option at market price with no expiration date. While most of the funds used in the 
repurchase program are a return on capital, the company retains this option value, which 
should be recorded on the asset side of the balance sheet.  
 
H5: The market recognizes the embedded option inherent in a firm’s decision to 
repurchase shares. Consequently, the company retains the option value to reissue the 
shares, at or near the current market price, which, when recorded as an asset and a 
corresponding increase to book value, will have the greatest explanatory power in the 
Fama-French 3-Factor Model. 
 
 These five hypotheses were based on prior evidence. When a firm decides to 
repurchase shares, it must make several choices, all of which can affect its stock price 
differently. The firm must choose how to repurchase the shares and how to record the 
repurchase on their books. Then, a firm has many choices of what to do with the 
repurchased shares – many of which can signal to the market something about the 
prospects of the company. This dissertation attempts to use the Fama-French 3-Factor 
Model to bring all of these possibilities together and find evidence of how the market 
interprets these management choices.  
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Chapter 3: Methodology 
 This study has two primary steps. The first is to make the adjustments to the book 
values of the S&P 500 to reflect the various hypothesized treatments of share 
repurchases. The second step is to estimate the Fama-French 3-Factor model based on the 
adjusted book values. 
 
The Sample 
 The final sample-set used in this study is all NYSE, Nasdaq and AmEx listed 
stocks from 1994 to 2019. While share buybacks have been a topic of conversation for 
more than 100 years, less than 30% of companies used share buybacks in any form in 
1980.  This usage rate dropped to a low of 25% by 1992-1993, before rapidly growing in 
popularity.  In 1997, share repurchases first exceeded dividends on a dollar basis and 
number of companies and that has mostly been the case since (Zeng & Luk, 2020).  Thus, 
data from 1994 forward is used in this study.    
 
The Adjustments to Book Value 
Four of the five treatments of share repurchases require adjustments to book value per 
current U.S. GAAP. This section will go into detail and use McDonald’s 2019’s balance 
sheet as an example for each adjustment. Table 1 shows all the inputs and results of the 
adjustments for three companies with different financial situations. This study chose 
McDonald’s because its heavy use of share repurchases reduced its total shareholders’ 
equity to negative. MasterCard is aggressive with share repurchases but still has positive 
shareholders’ equity. Finally, Lowe’s repurchases a significant number of shares, but it 
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retires the shares rather than holding the stock as treasury stock. The multiple examples 
shown demonstrate that companies’ accounting and strategic decisions impact their book 
values in different ways, which should result in different book-to-market value rankings 
depending on the hypothesis tested.  
 
H1: The market treats share repurchases as a return of capital to shareholders, such that 
the current accounting methods without adjustment will have the greatest explanatory 
power in the Fama-French 3-Factor Model. 
 This hypothesis uses current accounting standards. No adjustments are necessary. 
For our example company, McDonald’s, its FY 2019 book value was ($8.213) billion, 
with a market-cap on December 31, 2019, of $147.476 billion, rendering the book-to-
market value (-.056) meaningless, as it will drop out of the sample set. 
 
H2: The market treats share repurchases as a pre-paid cash expense, such that recording 
repurchased shares as an asset valued at the net cash of unexercised stock options, with a 
corresponding increase to book value will have the greatest explanatory power in the 
Fama-French 3-Factor Model. 
 Since Bens et al. (2003) found that share repurchases are tied to the issuing, not 
exercising of stock option grants, this study chose to base the value of the asset on the 
total number of stock options issued, rather than exercised. This choice will slightly 
inflate the number as not all issued options will be exercised. A practitioner study by 
Charles Schwab found that 76% of recipients of stock options never exercised them.  
However, it should be noted that this finding skewed by the many individuals that receive 
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small stock grants (O'Brien, 2018). In the sample company, McDonald’s, 500,000 shares, 
or 3% of stock options and RSUs were either forfeited or expired unexercised during the 
2019 fiscal year (McDonald's Inc, 2020).  
The adjustment to book value would create a new asset called “Treasury Stock 
Held for Equity Compensation.” Support for this adjustment comes from the McDonald’s 
2020 10-K stated which stated, “the Company uses treasury shares purchased under the 
Company’s share repurchase program to satisfy share-based exercises” (p.53). The asset 
amount is calculated using a non-cumulative LIFO method (meaning it would be re-
calculated every year in the sample).  
While it would be better in practice to create a system where options granted in 
year t were matched with repurchases made in the same year, company disclosures 
concerning stock option exercise do not provide sufficient detail to enable such matching. 
The remaining options are the LIFO, FIFO, and weighted-average cost assumptions.  
LIFO is the choice of this study because it has the advantage of finding data for 
companies that subsequently retire the shares. Additionally, using the most recent data 
helps when an acquisition or spin-off results in substantial changes to the number of 
options outstanding. However, note that since share prices tend to rise over time, the 
value of the prepaid asset will likely be higher than the preferred matching method. Any 
repurchased shares not needed to fund equity compensation will remain recorded under 
the existing accounting treatment.  
FIFO suffers from the inability to trace what shares were “used up” and what is 
left and would require an arbitrary starting point for creating the treasury balance. The 
weighted-average cost method is an attractive alternative and easy to calculate in firms 
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that have treasury stock. Treasury stock is a fungible item, without expiration, leading 
strength to this treatment. Interestingly, due to the strong market over the past ten years, 
the weighted average price of treasury stock can be below the average strike price of 
stock options. This scenario creates an unusual situation where the company is making a 
non-income statement capital gain when the options are exercised. However, in order to 
apply a weighted average method to companies that retire repurchased shares will require 
additional assumptions, including how long to create a pool of stock that would not be 
required for LIFO.  
To calculate the book value adjustment, the study uses fiscal year end stock 
options and restricted stock units issued, but not exercised. Using average stock prices 
over the fiscal year as a proxy for repurchase price for FYt and working backwards, the 
study records the average cost of satisfying those issued grants with treasury stock. The 
value of the asset is the repurchase price minus the exercise price of the option.6 The 
resulting adjustment would be a debit to increase the asset “Treasury Stock Held for 
Equity Compensation” asset and a credit to eliminate the Treasury Stock contra-equity 
amount.  This adjustment serves to raise book value. 
 
 For example, in FY19, McDonald’s had 16.0 million shares reserved for issued, 
but not exercised options (14.6 million with a weighted average strike price of $124.21). 
 
6 Note: this study ignores the tax implications, which would just be a timing difference rather than an 
economic difference. 
Treasury Stock Held for Equity Compensation XXXX
Treasury Stock XXXX
OR
Treasury Stock Held for Equity Compensation XXXX
Common Stock XXXX
Retained Earnings XXXX
Market View of Share Repurchases  48 
In 2019, the company repurchased 19.6 million shares with an average price of $198.28 
(McDonald's Inc., 2020). Consequently, the LIFO-based treasury stock average price to 
cover the 16.0 million shares would be $198.28. The pre-paid asset would then be: 
(198.28-124.21) * 14.6 options = $1.081 billion. This new asset would increase total 
assets and shareholders’ equity, leaving McDonald’s with a book value of ($7.132) 
billion and the same market capitalization of $147.48 billion, giving the company a book-
to-market value of -0.0483. 
 
H3: The market views share repurchases as a de facto partial acquisition of the firm and 
the monetization of internally generated goodwill such that the adjustment is the 
recognition of the cost of repurchased shares in excess of the book value as an intangible 
subject to impairment testing.  H3 posits that this adjustment will have the greatest 
explanatory power in the Fama-French 3-Factor Model. 
To calculate the asset of internally generated goodwill, this study will use Zhang’s 
(2013) method as follows: 
 Intangible Asset 12/31/t  = [Market Value 12/31/t – Book Value FYt].7  
This formula will generate a total value for internally generated goodwill that will need to 
be reduced to the percentage of shares repurchased compared to issued. For company’s 
using the treasury stock method, applying the percentage of treasury shares available on 
the balance sheet to total shares issued will provide the needed percentages. For 
companies that choose to retire their shares, this study will take the net difference 
between the number of shares outstanding at t0 and t-8 as a percentage of shares at t-8. Any 
 
7 Ideally, the model would use the fair value of identifiable net assets rather than book values. However, 
without the ability to revalue the assets on a company’s balance sheet, this is the best alternative available. 
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reduction is considered net share repurchases, and that percentage is applied. Note that 
the number of shares outstanding at t-8 will be adjusted for any subsequent stock splits. 
This metric implicitly assumes that any stock-based acquisition was the result of re-
issuing formerly retired shares when the difference is still positive. Companies with a 
higher share count at n0 will have no adjustments made.  
 
The t-8 cut off is a research design judgment. No previous literature was found 
that made these sorts of adjustments. Consequently, the average economic cycle during 
the period studied is used as the time horizon. According to the National Bureau of 
Economic Research, there were five complete economic cycles between 1979-2019, 
making it an average of 8 years (National Bureau of Economic Research, 2020). If 8 
years is too brief of a time horizon, the buyback activity of the firm will be understated.  
If 8 years is too high, a significant acquisition would result in a longer than necessary 
zero balance for internally generated goodwill.  
McDonald’s had a total market capitalization of $157.7 billion and a book value 
of ($8.21) billion, resulting in the internally generated goodwill of $165.91 billion. At 
fiscal year end, the company’s treasury stock account holds 914.3 million of the 1,660.6 
million shares issued or 55%. These figures result in an internally generated goodwill 
asset value of $91.35 billion, increasing its book value to $83.13 billion, and making its 
book-to-market value 0.526. 
 
Internally Generated Goodwill XXXX
Treasury Stock XXXX
OR
Internally Generated Goodwill XXXX
Common Stock XXXX
Retained Earnings XXXX
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H4: The market views share repurchases as a prepaid acquisition, such that recording 
repurchased shares as a cash equivalent asset of the firm, with a corresponding increase 
to book value will have the greatest explanatory power in the Fama-French 3-Factor 
Model. 
 This method is simple, rather than recording treasury stock at cost in a contra-
equity account, treasury stock is treated as an asset, at lower of cost or market value. The 
short-term asset would be subject to impairment tests, which would be required if the 
market value of the shares was less than the book value recorded. Consequently, when 
recording this asset, the asset would be the lesser of the recorded treasury stock book 
value or the number of shares multiplied by the share price at year-end.  
 Based on this assumption, adjustments are required for companies that choose to 
retire their shares. To find the net number of shares repurchased, the same calculation as 
for the prior hypothesis is applied (i.e., take the difference between n0 and n-8 shares 
outstanding). This number of shares is multiplied by the weighted average repurchase 
price over the same 8-year period, proxied as the average share price in the year of 
repurchase.  This process generates an approximation of the book value of retired shares. 
Like the treasury share adjustment, this book value will be subject to an impairment test 
equal to the number of net repurchased shares calculated multiplied by the year end share 
price.     
 
Treasury Stock Asset XXXX
Treasury Stock XXXX
OR
Treasury Stock Asset XXXX
Common Stock XXXX
Retained Earnings XXXX
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The cost of McDonald’s treasury stock was $66.33 billion in FY19. With 914.3 
million shares of treasury stock and a share price of $197.61, the hypothetical value of 
the stock is $180.7 billion. This result suggests the book value is not impaired, and the 
$66.33 billion can be recorded as an asset in this adjustment. Adding the $66.33 billion to 
the ($8.21) billion book value creates an adjusted book value of $58.12 billion. This 
adjustment increases the book-to-market value to 0.369.  
 
H5: The market recognizes the embedded option inherent in a firm’s decision to 
repurchase shares. Consequently, the company retains the option value to reissue the 
shares, at or near the current market price, which, when recorded as an asset and a 
corresponding increase to book value, will have the greatest explanatory power in the 
Fama-French 3-Factor Model. 
 Using the Black-Scholes-Merton Option Pricing Model and the assumptions the 
companies make to value their stock options, as disclosed in the notes to the financial 
statements, the put option value can be calculated for the potential to reissue treasury 
stock. While the other four hypotheses will use data from 1979-2019, H5 will use data 
only from 2003-2019 when sufficient disclosure of the option-pricing model assumptions 
began, due to the rules of Fama-French, the sample will start in 2005. Up until 1995, 
investors did not have a ready source of information to analyze the company’s 
assumptions on its stock option value, which makes it unlikely the market implicitly 
adjusted for this option.  
 This study has chosen to use the Black-Scholes-Merton option pricing model 
(Merton, 1973) to correspond with the method used by most S&P 500 firms. Rather than 
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attempt to create the assumptions of volatility, dividend yields, and risk-free rates, it 
seems prudent to use the same figures the firms do when expensing their stock options. 
These assumptions are also the likely figures firms would choose when attempting to 
create a fair value for re-issuing Treasury Stock in an audit to achieve internal 
consistency. According to Finnerty (2014), 80% of S&P 500 companies use Black-
Scholes-Merton to calculate their stock option expenses, substituting in the life of the 
grant for the length of the contract. 
 Stock option expense notes to the financial statements’ information are available 
for most of the inputs required for the Black-Scholes-Merton model (namely the assumed 
risk-free rate, stock price volatility, and dividend yield). This source of data leaves three 
more inputs to use the formula: the underlying price, the strike price, and the length of the 
option.  
 The underlying price is assumed to be the weighted-average share price of the 
treasury stock. This figure is readily available on the balance sheet. It is also theoretically 
sound since treasury shares are fungible. 
 There are two main alternatives for an assumed strike price. The first is to choose 
the year-end stock price, which would suggest the market value is equal to the issuance 
value of the treasury stock. It is simple and would put the option “at the money.” The 
second alternative the average discount of a seasoned share offering when issuing large 
quantities of treasury stock.  Mola and Loughran (2004) used 3%. Altınkılıç and Hansen 
(2003) calculated a similar discount estimate of 3.2%.  Thus, discounting the year-end 
stock price for each company by 3% would also be theoretically defensible. This study 
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uses both but the “at the money” and 3% discount options but does not expect the 
adjustment to change the results materially. 
Technically, the time a company can exercise this put option is infinite. However, 
to calculate a proxy for the typical life of this option, this study investigated the 
frequency of share issuance in the S&P 500.  Increases in shares outstanding would 
indicate that a firm issued shares that fiscal year. Data shown in Figure 1 suggests that on 
average 47% of S&P 500 companies from 1995-2019 were net issuers of shares. With a 
small bit of rounding, this data would suggest an approximate 2-year life for the put 
option. Note, the percentage of net issuers is declining as time goes on, with an average 
of only 36% from 2011 to 2019. Since this is a significant assumption in this hypothesis, 
a sensitivity analysis will be conducted to show the robustness of this assumption.  
 
Year
% of S&P 500 
Companies with 
Increasing Share Count Year
% of S&P 500 
Companies with 
Increasing Share Count
1995 61% 2008 40%
1996 55% 2009 66%
1997 54% 2010 54%
1998 51% 2011 36%
1999 52% 2012 45%
2000 51% 2013 38%
2001 67% 2014 33%
2002 62% 2015 30%
2003 66% 2016 37%
2004 58% 2017 37%
2005 46% 2018 31%
2006 39% 2019 36%
2007 32% Source: Bloomberg, 2020b
Figure 2: Percent of Companies with Weighted Average Share Count 
Increases
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While companies that retire shares are shown statistically to issue new shares at a 
slightly higher frequency as those who hold them in treasury (Banyi & Caplan, 2016), 
other research shows that treasury shares are considered closer to cash than newly issued 
shares in acquisitions (Jenkins & Ovtchinnikov, 2010). This finding suggests the two 
forms of issues are not economically equivalent. Since retired shares require the company 
to create new shares to re-issue, this study will assume that retired shares do not create 
the same option value as treasury shares. 
 
For McDonald’s, the company stated its expected dividend yield was 2.7%, its 
expected stock price volatility was 18.9%, and its expected risk-free rate was 2.5%. As a 
default, primarily to force the companies to re-assess the option value frequently, a one 
year expected life was assumed. Finally, the exercise price was set to be equal to the 
12/31 price used in the market value above ($197.61), and the underlying price was 
determined to be the average price paid for the treasury stock ($72.55) – since that would 
represent any gain the company would have had if they reissued the shares. These 
assumptions generated a $140.55 value for a put option of 100 shares, valuing all treasury 
stock options at $1.29 billion (the adjustment to book value). This adjustment brought 
McDonald’s book-to-market value at -0.044. 
Treasury Stock Put Option XXXX
Treasury Stock XXXX




Table 3: Three Examples of Adjustments to Book Equity to Market Equity for each Hypothosis Summary of Book-to-Market
McDonald's Mastercard Lowe's MCD MA LOW
FY19 Book Value ($b) (8.21)$         5.89$         1.97$         H1 -0.056 0.020 0.021
12/31/19 Market Capitalization ($b) 147.48$       300.68$     94.11$       H2 -0.048 0.023 0.021
H3 0.526 0.296 0.434
H4 0.394 0.127 0.295
H1: H5 -0.047 0.022 0.021
No Adjustments
Book-to-Market Value -0.056 0.020 0.021 H4: McDonald's Mastercard Lowes
Weighted Avg. Price Paid, 8 years $43.64
H2: Total # of Treasury Shares 914.3 395 592
Book Value of Repurchased Shares ($b) $66.33 32.21$     25.83$       
# of Stock Options Granted 14.6 6.6 2.343 Increase to Book Value Adjustement ($b) $66.33 32.21$     25.83$       
Average Strike Price of Options $124.21 $117.00 $86.01 Book-to-Market Value 0.394 0.127 0.295
LIFO Price of Repurchased Shares $198.28 $249.58 $104.68
Increase to Book Value Adjustment ($b) $1.08 $0.88 $0.04 H5:
Book-to-Market Value -0.048 0.023 0.021 Expected Dividend Yield 2.70% 0.60%
Expected Stock Price Volatility 18.90% 19.60%
H3: Risk-Free Interest Rate 2.50% 2.60%
Total Internally Generated Goodwill $155.69 $294.79 $92.14 Expected Life 1 year 1 year
Total # of Repurchased Shares 914.3 395 592 Exercise Price (6/30 Price) $197.61 $269.99
# of Shares Issued 1660.6 1402 1403 Stock Price (Avg. Price of Treasury Shares) $72.55 81.53$     
% of Issued Shares Repurchased 55% 28% 42% Black-Scholes Value per Option $140.55 $190.55
Increase to Book Value Adjustement ($b) $85.72 $83.05 $38.88 Increase to Book Value Adjustement ($b) $1.29 $0.75
Book-to-Market Value 0.526 0.296 0.434 Book-to-Market Value -0.047 0.022 0.021
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Fama-French 3-Factor Model 
To determine which method of accounting for share buybacks the market appears 
to use, this study will apply the methodology used by Fama and French (1992, 1993, and 
1995) in testing the 3-Factor Model. This method classified NYSE, Nasdaq and AmEx 
listed stocks into six sub-portfolios to determine if different sized or type firms use share 
repurchases differently. Models based on Fama and French’s 30 industry break down 
(French, 2021) was also run to determine if different industries use share repurchases 
differently.   
Fama and French (1993) presented the following regression that can explain 
between 80% and 95% of stock price movements. 
 
The HML variable will vary as a result of the share repurchase adjustments to book value 
previously discussed. First, using June 30 of year t for each year from 1979-2019, sample 
set stocks will be ranked by market capitalization. The median value will be used to 
separate the high market cap stocks (Big) vs. the lower market cap stocks (Small). The 
breakpoint between small and big will be the median market cap of NYSE listed stocks. 
Since the NYSE is dominated by large-cap stocks, the “small” market cap portfolios will 
be significantly larger than the “big” portfolios. Second, the sample set of stocks will be 
broken into three groups based on the book-to-market values calculated for each 
company (this will be repeated multiple time for the various hypotheses). Following 
Fama and French’s (1993) acknowledged arbitrary group rankings, the low group will 
have the bottom 30% of BE/ME companies, the middle group will have the next 40% of 
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stocks, and the high group will have the top BE/ME companies. Note, since the primary 
focus of the study is share repurchases, which can drive total common shareholders’ 
equity below zero, negative book value companies may be added back to the sample set 
due to the adjustments made, since Fama and French excluded negative book value 
companies in their methodology. Book value is defined as the book value of 
shareholders’ equity minus any reported book value of preferred equity at the end of F.Y. 
t-1. The market capitalization used for this metric will be December 31 of t-1, consistent 
with Fama & French’s methodology. The lag in the accounting-based figures is to allow 
the model to predict the return. Finally, using the two groups of SMB and three groups of 
HML, six initial portfolios (Small/Low, Small/Medium, Small/High, Big/Low, 
Big/Medium, Big/High) will be generated. 
The value-weighted, monthly returns of the six portfolios, from July 1 of year t to 
June 30, t+1 will be run through the Fama-French 3-Factor Model. SMB will be 
calculated as the difference, each month, between the simple average of the value-
weighted monthly average returns of the small portfolios (Small/Low, Small/Medium, 
Small/High) minus the big portfolios (Big/Low, Big/Medium, Big/High). HML is defined 
as the difference between the monthly average value-weighted returns of the high 
portfolios (Small/High, Big/High) and the low portfolios (Small/Low, Big/Low); the 
middle 40% is excluded in calculating this input. Note, while SMB and HML both use 
market capitalization as a part of their metric, the correlation between the two measures 
have historically been negligible (Fama & French, 1993), reducing the chance of multi-
collinearity. Value-weighted returns of all stocks in the sample set is the proxy for the 
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market return. The one-month T-bill rate is the proxy for the risk-free rate metric to be 
consistent with industry standards and Fama and French’s methodology.  
With six portfolios and five methods to value book-value, the overall and 
incremental R2s of the HML variable was be compared to try and determine which book 
value treatment yields the greatest explanation of the stock price movements of the 
portfolios.  
One additional set of secondary data was also evaluated. To determine if different 
industries may use share repurchases differently, 30 industry portfolios from French’s 
website (2021) was analyzed using the Fama-French 3 Factor model.  
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Chapter 4: Results 
The first hypothesis (H1) evaluates the status quo.  As such, the Fama-French 3-
factor model is replicated using the data from 1994-2019.  This replication sets a 
benchmark upon which the upcoming adjusted equity measures will be compared.    
Using data from Compustat and CRSP, the model was replicated with insignificant 
differences from Fama and French (1993).  Table 4 presents the correlations.  Observed 
correlations between the replicated model and data from French’s website (French, 2021) 
is 97.8% on the “Small Minus Big” (SMB) factor and 94.5% on the “High Minus Low” 
(HML) factor for the 40-year period.  The correlation has generally increased over time.  
For example, SMB’s correlations are 99.1% and HML’s 96.6% for the most recent five 
years (2014-2019).  The main difference between French’s (2021) method and the 
replication is the use of CUSIPs as a matching devise in the replication study, which 
reduces the number of observations compared to French’s use of the CRSP/Compustat 
Merge tables available on WRDS.  Over time, the difference between the number of 
observations in the two methodologies narrow, which likely accounts for the 
improvement in the correlation coefficient.  
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Next, the identical six size portfolios used in the original study were replicated.  
The firms are categorized based on size (big or small) and based on their book-to-market 
ratios (high, medium, and low).   Hence, six portfolios result - Big/High, Big/Medium, 
Big/Low, Small/High, Small/Medium, and Small/Low.  Recall that the high book-to-
market firms are “value” firms (i.e., low market to book ratio) and the low book-to-
market firms are “growth” firms (i.e., high market to book firms).  The six portfolios are 










1994-2019 0.983 0.945 4,753    3,204          
1994-1999 0.978 0.942 6,603    3,799          
1999-2004 0.983 0.943 5,484    3,559          
2004-2009 0.976 0.961 4,421    3,091          
2009-2014 0.988 0.980 3,685    2,757          
2014-2019 0.991 0.966 3,572    2,812          
 r jt  - r ft  = αj  + βj1 (r mt -r ft ) + βj2 (SMB t ) + βj3(HMLt) + εjt
r jt  is the value-weighted monthly return of a designated portfolio.
r ft  is the monthly risk-free return proxied by the one-month Treasury bill, taken at the 
first day of the month.
r mt  is the value-weighted monthly return of all NYSE, AmEx, and NASDAQ stocks 
with at least two years of trading data and recorded book value.
SMB t  the difference in monthly, value-weighted returns of big stocks (market 
capitalization on June 30, t  greater than the median of the NYSE listed firm) and small 
stocks (market capitalization below the median of the NYSE listed stocks).
HML t  the difference in monthly, value-weighted returns of stocks ranked high (top 30% 
of book equity to market equity) and stocks ranked low (bottom 30% of book equity to 
market equity).  Book equity was comuted by the book value of shareholder's equity 
minus any reported book value of preferred equity at the end of fiscal year t-1 .  Market 
equity was measured on Dec 31, t-1 .
Table 4: Correlations of Betas of Factors in replication of Fama-French 3-Factor Model 
vs published factors from French's (2021) data website
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market value of equity at June t is used to rank the firms, with all ranked largest to 
smallest.  The median size value of the NYSE is used as the break point.  Due to size 
differences between NYSE-, Amex- and NASDAQ-listed stocks, with the latter two 
having a greater number of small-cap and micro-cap stocks, a majority of firms end up in 
the small portfolios (an average of 2,557 firms per year are categorized as small out of an 
average 3,204 total firms per year). Additionally, all firms are ranked by their book 
equity to market equity.  Breakpoints are created at the 30th and 70th percentile each year 
and the pool of stocks are divided accordingly.  The six portfolios are then created based 
on the cross section of the two metrics. 
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Small Big Small Big
High 0.964 1.017 High 103.35 65.12
Medium 0.953 0.984 Medium 70.87 53.95
Low 1.032 0.948 Low 67.23 97.64
Small Big Small Big
High 0.837 0.016 High 63.74 0.72
Medium 0.820 -0.138 Medium 43.29 -5.36
Low 1.037 -0.184 Low 47.93 -13.43
Small Big Small Big
High 0.737 0.804 High 57.10 37.19
Medium 0.458 0.422 Medium 24.61 16.70
Low -0.214 -0.244 Low -10.07 -18.17
Small Big Small Big
High 0.984 0.942 High 0.0067 0.0111
Medium 0.972 0.908 Medium 0.0110 0.0130
Low 0.970 0.974 Low 0.0112 0.0069
HML t  the difference in monthly, value-weighted returns of stocks ranked high (top 30% of 
book equity to market equity) and stocks ranked low (bottom 30% of book equity to 
market equity).  Book equity was comuted by the book value of shareholder's equity minus 
any reported book value of preferred equity at the end of fiscal year t-1 .  Market equity 
was measured on Dec 31, t-1 .
The six portfolios were created from the cross section of the SMB and HML factors.  
Monthly value-weighted returns represent July t  to June t+1 .
R2 and the standard error are adjusted for degrees of freedom.
r ft  is the monthly risk-free return proxied by the one-month Treasury bill, taken at the first 
day of the month.
r mt  is the value-weighted monthly return of all NYSE, AmEx, and NASDAQ stocks with 
at least two years of trading data and recorded book value.
SMB t  the difference in monthly, value-weighted returns of big stocks (market capitalization 
on June 30, t  greater than the median of the NYSE listed firm) and small stocks (market 
capitalization below the median of the NYSE listed stocks).
Table 5: Results of replication regressions (H1) of monthly returns of six portfolio on excess 
market returns, size and book-to-market factors from July 1994 to June 2019
 r jt  - r ft  = αj  + βj1 (r mt -r ft ) + βj2 (SMB t ) + βj3(HMLt) + εjt
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See table 5 for results.  The three Fama French factors explain a significant 
portion of the variance for all six portfolios.  Coefficients of determination (i.e., R-
squareds) range from a low of 0.908 for the big/medium portfolio to a high of 0.984 for 
the small/high portfolio. The market beta coefficient was statistically significant in all 
cases with a t-value range of 53.95 for the big/medium portfolio to a high of 103.35 for 
the small/high portfolio. The market beta coefficient hovered near 1 for all portfolios. 
The SMB variable was statically significant for all portfolio at the 95% level except for 
the big/high portfolio. The coefficient for the SMB factor was large and positive for the 
small portfolios, but small and negative for the big portfolios suggesting that the factor 
does successfully capture the difference in the variation of returns by size. The HML 
factor was also statistically significant for all six portfolios. The coefficient was 
meaningful and positive for the high portfolios and went down incrementally, turning 
negative for the low portfolios. This relationship is consistent with the suggestion that 
HML captures the risk factor difference between the high book-to-market portfolios (a 
proxy for value stocks) and low book-to-market portfolios (a proxy for growth stocks). 
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2 Factor 3 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor
R2 0.804 0.984 R2 0.674 0.942
∆R2 0.179 ∆R2 0.267
F 3260.196 F 1383.061
p-value 0.00 p-value 0.00
2 Factor 3 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor
R2 0.895 0.965 R2 0.822 0.908
∆R2 0.070 ∆R2 0.086
F 605.80 F 279.057
p-value 0.00 p-value 0.00
2 Factor 3 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor
R2 0.962 0.972 R2 0.945 0.974
∆R2 0.010 ∆R2 0.029
F 101.36 F 330.27
p-value 0.00 p-value 0.00
R2 is adjusted for degrees of freedom.
Table 6: Incremental Validity of the HML Factor in the Replication Model (H1)
r ft  is the monthly risk-free return proxied by the one-month Treasury bill, taken at the first day of the 
month.
r mt  is the value-weighted monthly return of all NYSE, AmEx, and NASDAQ stocks with at least two 
years of trading data and recorded book value.
SMB t  the difference in monthly, value-weighted returns of big stocks (market capitalization on June 
30, t  greater than the median of the NYSE listed firm) and small stocks (market capitalization below 
the median of the NYSE listed stocks).
HML t  the difference in monthly, value-weighted returns of stocks ranked high (top 30% of book 
equity to market equity) and stocks ranked low (bottom 30% of book equity to market equity).  Book 
equity was comuted by the book value of shareholder's equity minus any reported book value of 
preferred equity at the end of fiscal year t-1 .  Market equity was measured on Dec 31, t-1 .
The six portfolios were created from the cross section of the SMB and HML factors.  Monthly value-
weighted returns represent July t  to June t+1 .
2 Factor Model: r jt  - r ft  = αj  + βj1 (r mt -r ft ) + βj2 (SMB t ) + εjt




r jt  is the value-weighted monthly return of a designated portfolio.
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In Fama and French (2004), the authors argue that “HML does the heavy lifting” 
in the improvement of the model over the Black-Fisher Capital Asset Pricing Model. 
Table 3 confirms that HML’s addition to the model does improve its explanatory power 
by a statistically significant amount for each of the six portfolios, with improvements in 
R2 ranging from 0.010 for the small/low portfolio (the small cap growth portfolio) to a 
high of 0.267 for the big/high portfolio (the large cap value portfolio).  
 
∆R2 S/H S/M S/L B/H B/M B/L
1994-1999 0.110* 0.026* 0.007* 0.203* 0.049* 0.038*
1999-2004 0.332* 0.157* 0.002* 0.412* 0.250* 0.016*
2004-2009 0.074* 0.014* 0.006* 0.120* 0.011* 0.030*
2009-2014 0.059* 0.004* 0.010* 0.082* 0.006* 0.024*
2014-2019 0.076* 0.022* 0.027* 0.129* 0.016* 0.041*
r jt  is the value-weighted monthly return of a designated portfolio.
* p<0.05
2 Factor Model: r jt  - r ft  = αj  + βj1 (r mt -r ft ) + βj2 (SMB t ) + εjt
3 Factor Model: r jt  - r ft  = αj  + βj1 (r mt -r ft ) + βj2 (SMB t ) + βj3(HMLt) + εjt
Table 7: Incremental Validity of the HML Factor in the Replication Model (H1) by 
Five Year Periods
r ft  is the monthly risk-free return proxied by the one-month Treasury bill, taken at 
the first day of the month.
r mt  is the value-weighted monthly return of all NYSE, AmEx, and NASDAQ 
stocks with at least two years of trading data and recorded book value.
SMB t  the difference in monthly, value-weighted returns of big stocks (market 
capitalization on June 30, t  greater than the median of the NYSE listed firm) and 
small stocks (market capitalization below the median of the NYSE listed stocks).
HML t  the difference in monthly, value-weighted returns of stocks ranked high 
(top 30% of book equity to market equity) and stocks ranked low (bottom 30% of 
book equity to market equity).  Book equity was comuted by the book value of 
shareholder's equity minus any reported book value of preferred equity at the end 
of fiscal year t-1 .  Market equity was measured on Dec 31, t-1 .
The six portfolios were created from the cross section of the SMB and HML 
factors.  Monthly value-weighted returns represent July t  to June t+1 .
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As shown in Table 7, the relative contribution of the HML factor has changed 
greatly during the 15-year period. During the internet bubble, the HML factor was one of 
the largest components of explaining the variation in returns, especially in the high book-
to-market (value) portfolios. There is no clear sustained pattern of strengthening or 
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H2: HML Adjusted for Prepaid Stock Option Expense Asset 
 
H2 evaluates the model with treasury stock costs capitalized as an asset to fund 
future share issuances to fulfill the exercise of stock options.  Heightened correlations 
N Mean (BV) St. Dev (BV) t(BV)
1994-2019
H1 105,857 2,026     9,691           
H2 106,573 2,028     9,683           -0.04
1994-1999
H1 22,858   483        2,006           
H2 23,212   482        2,007           0.04
1999-2004
H1 22,490   957        3,816           
H2 22,692   971        3,878           -0.39
2004-2009
H1 19,683   1,937     7,785           
H2 19,740   1,953     7,815           -0.20
2009-2014
H1 17,825   3,046     12,243         
H2 17,866   3,054     12,254         -0.06
2014-2019
H1 23,001   3,892     15,433         
H2 23,063   3,892     15,428         -0.01
Table 8: Descriptive Statistics of Book Values used in the Replicated Fama-French 3-Factor 
Model (H1) and the Book Value adjusted for the Capitalization of Repurchased Shares used 
to fund Stock Options (H2)
Book equity (H1) was computed by the book value of shareholder's equity minus any 
reported book value of preferred equity at the end of fiscal year t-1 . 
Book equity (H2) was computed as the book value of shareholder's equity minus any 
reported book value of preferred equity plus calculated pre-paid option expense at the end of 
fiscal year t-1. 
Pre-paid option expense asset is calculated as the number of unexercised but outstanding 
stock options times the difference between the average price of repurchased shares - the 
average exercise price.
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with share price would suggest the market appears to value share repurchases consistent 
with this logic.   
 
This treatment resulted in an increase in the number of observations (106,573 
compared to 105,857) because formerly negative book value companies shifted to 
positive because of the addition of the Treasury Stock Held for Equity Compensation 
asset. This resulted in very small changes in book value with the mean for the entire 
sample set increasing from $2,026 million to $2,028 million. The resulting recorded 
equity adjustments did not create statistically significant changes in mean book values 
according to a t-test, t (212,416) = -0.04, p=0.969.   
  
Treasury Stock Held for Equity Compensation XXXX
Treasury Stock XXXX
OR
Treasury Stock Held for Equity Compensation XXXX
Common Stock XXXX
Retained Earnings XXXX
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N Mean St. Dev t-score N Mean St. Dev Min Max t-score N Mean St. Dev Min Max t-score N Mean St. Dev Min Max t-score
1994-2019
H1 105,819 3.03 72.53 39,362 7.47 118.78 0.62 17942.17 36,274 0.56 0.14 0.2779 1.17 30,183 0.21 0.10 0.00 0.54
H2 106,534 3.06 73.02 -0.09 39,811 7.52 119.32 0.62 17942.17 -0.05 36,334 0.56 0.14 0.2827 1.18 -4.16 30,389 0.22 0.10 0.00 0.54 -4.31
1994-1999
H1 22,854   3.10 89.95 8,296   7.88 140.87 0.62 10719.04 7,639   0.53 0.11 0.3095 0.80 6,919   0.22 0.10 0.00 0.43
H2 23,207   3.22 87.17 -0.15 8,451   8.18 144.32 0.62 10719.04 -0.14 7,733   0.53 0.11 0.3160 0.80 -1.05 7,023   0.22 0.10 0.00 0.43 0.37
1999-2004
H1 22,484   4.76 126.83 8,856   11.43 201.92 0.75 17942.17 7,612   0.61 0.14 0.3457 0.91 6,016   0.21 0.11 0.00 0.46
H2 22,686   4.76 126.28 0.01 8,957   11.37 200.79 0.75 17942.17 0.02 7,613   0.61 0.14 0.3534 0.92 -3.37 6,116   0.22 0.11 0.00 0.47 -3.70
2004-2009
H1 19,673   2.46 25.82 6,628   6.58 44.20 0.63 2072.52 7,043   0.50 0.09 0.3320 0.73 6,002   0.21 0.09 0.00 0.36
H2 19,730   2.46 25.79 -0.02 6,681   6.55 44.03 0.63 2072.52 0.04 7,059   0.50 0.09 0.3359 0.73 -4.20 5,990   0.22 0.09 0.00 0.37 -3.49
2009-2014
H1 17,815   2.35 19.70 7,007   5.22 31.19 0.77 1300.71 5,873   0.66 0.17 0.39 1.17 4,935   0.26 0.12 0.00 0.54
H2 17,856   2.36 19.68 -0.06 7,082   5.21 31.03 0.77 1300.71 0.02 5,866   0.67 0.17 0.39 1.18 -1.19 4,908   0.27 0.12 0.00 0.54 -1.94
2014-2019
H1 22,993   2.29 20.76 8,575   5.53 33.75 0.64 1164.59 8,107   0.50 0.13 0.28 0.87 6,311   0.18 0.08 0.00 0.34
H2 23,055   2.29 20.74 -0.01 8,640   5.51 33.63 0.65 1164.59 0.04 8,063   0.51 0.13 0.28 0.87 -1.31 6,352   0.18 0.08 0.00 0.35 -1.55
Table 9: Descriptive Statistics of Book Equity-to-Market Equity ratios of the original Fama-French 3-Factor Model (H1) and the Book Value adjusted for the Capitalization of Repurchased Shares 
used to Fund Stock Options (H2)
Market equity was measured on Dec 31, t-1.
Portfolio buckets were created as high (top 30% of book equity to market equity), medium (middle 40% of book equity to market equity) and low (bottom 30% of book equity to market equity).  
Pre-paid option expense asset is calculated as the number of unexercised but outstanding stock options times the difference between the average price of repurchased shares - the average exercise price
Book equity (H1) was computed as the book value of shareholder's equity minus any reported book value of preferred equity at the end of fiscal year t-1. 
Entire Sample High Medium Low
Book equity (H2) was computed as the book value of shareholder's equity minus any reported book value of preferred equity plus calculated pre-paid option expense at the end of fiscal year t-1. 
Market View of Share Repurchases  70 
A small drop in sample set size (from 106,573 book values to 106,534 book-to-
market values for H2) was the result of missing market values in the larger sample. While 
there were no statistically significant changes to the mean book-to-market in the entire 
sample, the addition of prepaid share repurchases to the book value resulted in some 
meaningful changes to the portfolios created by the Fama-French model in the later years 
of the sample. From 1999-2009, statistically significant changes are observed in the mean 
values in the low and medium portfolios. From 2009-2019, changes in all portfolios were 
statistically significant at the 90% threshold. 
 










adj. HML t  the difference in monthly, value-weighted returns of stocks ranked high 
(top 30% of adjusted book equity for pre-paid option expense to market equity) and 
stocks ranked low (bottom 30% of adjusted book equity for pre-paid option 
expense to market equity).  Adjusted book equity was computed as the book value 
of shareholder's equity minus any reported book value of preferred equity plus the 
number of unexercised but outstanding stock options times the difference between the 
average price of repurchased at the end of fiscal year t-1 .  Market equity was 
measured on Dec 31, t-1 .
r jt  is the value-weighted monthly return of a designated portfolio.
r ft  is the monthly risk-free return proxied by the one-month Treasury bill, taken at the 
first day of the month.
r mt  is the value-weighted monthly return of all NYSE, AmEx, and NASDAQ stocks 
with at least two years of trading data and recorded book value.
SMB t  the difference in monthly, value-weighted returns of big stocks (market 
capitalization on June 30, t  greater than the median of the NYSE listed firm) and 
small stocks (market capitalization below the median of the NYSE listed stocks).
HML t  the difference in monthly, value-weighted returns of stocks ranked high (top 
30% of book equity to market equity) and stocks ranked low (bottom 30% of book 
equity to market equity).  Book equity was comuted by the book value of 
shareholder's equity minus any reported book value of preferred equity at the end of 
fiscal year t-1 .  Market equity was measured on Dec 31, t-1 .
Table 10: Correlations and Paired T-Tests of Betas of Factors in replication of Fama-
French 3-Factor Model (H1) vs. Book Value adjusted for the Capitalization of 
Repurchased Shares used to fund Stock Options (H2)
H1: r jt  - r ft  = αj  + βj1 (r mt -r ft ) + βj2 (SMB t ) + βj3(HMLt) + εjt
H2: r jt  - r ft  = αj  + βj1 (r mt -r ft ) + βj2 (SMB t ) + βj3(adj. HMLt) + εjt
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The correlation between the HML Factor generated in H1 and H2 is almost 
perfect. Additionally, a paired t-test shows no statistical difference in the measured 
factors across all periods. The small difference is unlikely to generate a statistically 
significant change in the regressions. 
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Small Big Small Big
High 0.97 1.02 High 106.11 64.85
Mid 0.95 0.99 Mid 71.82 55.59
Low 1.04 0.95 Low 69.10 98.60
Small Big Small Big
High 0.84 0.03 High 65.06 1.26
Mid 0.81 -0.14 Mid 43.60 -5.61
Low 1.05 -0.18 Low 49.19 -13.45
Small Big Small Big
High 0.74 0.79 High 57.26 35.79
Mid 0.45 0.39 Mid 24.16 15.55
Low -0.24 -0.24 Low -11.08 -17.41
Small Big Small Big
High 0.984 0.942 High 0.0065 0.0113
Mid 0.966 0.913 Mid 0.0094 0.0127
Low 0.973 0.974 Low 0.0108 0.0069
SMB t  the difference in monthly, value-weighted returns of big stocks (market capitalization on June 30, t 
greater than the median of the NYSE listed firm) and small stocks (market capitalization below the median of 
the NYSE listed stocks).
adj. HML t  the difference in monthly, value-weighted returns of stocks ranked high (top 30% of adjusted 
book equity for pre-paid option expense to market equity) and stocks ranked low (bottom 30% of adjusted 
book equity for pre-paid option expense to market equity).  Adjusted book equity was computed as the 
book value of shareholder's equity minus any reported book value of preferred equity plus the number of 
unexercised but outstanding stock options times the difference between the average price of repurchased at 
the end of fiscal year t-1 .  Market equity was measured on Dec 31, t-1 .
The six portfolios were created from the cross section of the SMB and HML factors.  Monthly value-
weighted returns represent July t  to June t+1 .
R2 and the standard error are adjusted for degrees of freedom.
Table 11: Results of regressions of monthly returns on six portfolio on excess market returns, size and book-
to-market factors from July 1994 to June 2019 adjusting Book Value adjusted for the Capitalization of 





r jt  is the value-weighted monthly return of a designated portfolio.
r ft  is the monthly risk-free return proxied by the one-month Treasury bill, taken at the first day of the month.
r mt  is the value-weighted monthly return of all NYSE, AmEx, and NASDAQ stocks with at least two years 
of trading data and recorded book value.
 r jt  - r ft  = αj  + βj1 (r mt -r ft ) + βj2 (SMB t ) + βj3(adj. HMLt) + εjt
βj3
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Table 11 presents the multiple regression results of the Fama-French 3 Factor 
Model adjusted for the pre-paid stock option asset treatment of repurchased shares and 
six portfolios. The three factors continue to explain a significant portion of the variance 
of all six portfolios (ranging from a low of 0.913 for the big/medium portfolio to a high 
of 0.984 for the small/high portfolio). The market beta coefficient was statistically 
significant in all cases with a t-value range of 55.59 for the big/medium portfolio to a 
high of 106.11 for the small/high portfolio. The market beta coefficient value hovered 
near 1 for all portfolios. The SMB variable was statically significant for all portfolio at 
the 95% level except for the big/high portfolio (a proxy for large cap growth stocks). The 
coefficient for the SMB factor was large and positive for the small portfolios, but small 
and negative for the big portfolios suggesting that the factor does successfully capture the 
difference in the variation of returns by size. Finally, the HML factor was statically 
significant for all six portfolios. The coefficient was significant and positive for the high 
portfolios and went down incrementally, turning negative for the low portfolios. This 
relationship is consistent with the argument that HML captures the risk factor difference 
between the high book-to-market portfolios and low book-to-market portfolios. These 
results mirror the results of H1.  
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2 Factor 3 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor
R2 0.812 0.984 R2 0.689 0.941
∆R2 0.171 ∆R2 0.251
F 3278.372 F 1281.052
p-value 0 p-value 0
2 Factor 3 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor
R2 0.899 0.966 R2 0.842 0.913
∆R2 0.066 ∆R2 0.071
F 583.716 F 241.834
p-value 0 p-value 0
2 Factor 3 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor
R2 0.962 0.973 R2 0.948 0.974
∆R2 0.011 ∆R2 0.026
F 122.815 F 303.176
p-value 0 p-value 0
r mt  is the value-weighted monthly return of all NYSE, AmEx, and NASDAQ stocks with at least 
two years of trading data and recorded book value.
SMB t  the difference in monthly, value-weighted returns of big stocks (market capitalization on 
June 30, t  greater than the median of the NYSE listed firm) and small stocks (market capitalization 
below the median of the NYSE listed stocks).
adj. HML t  the difference in monthly, value-weighted returns of stocks ranked high (top 30% of 
adjusted book equity for pre-paid option expense to market equity) and stocks ranked low 
(bottom 30% of adjusted book equity for pre-paid option expense to market equity).  Adjusted 
book equity was computed as the book value of shareholder's equity minus any reported book 
value of preferred equity plus the number of unexercised but outstanding stock options times the 
difference between the average price of repurchased at the end of fiscal year t-1 .  Market equity 
was measured on Dec 31, t-1 .
The six portfolios were created from the cross section of the SMB and HML factors.  Monthly 
value-weighted returns represent July t  to June t+1 .




Table 12: Incremental Validity of the HML Factor Book Value adjusted for the Capitalization of 
Repurchased Shares used to fund Stock Options (H2)
2 Factor Model: r jt  - r ft  = αj  + βj1 (r mt -r ft ) + βj2 (SMB t ) + εjt
3 Factor Model: r jt  - r ft  = αj  + βj1 (r mt -r ft ) + βj2 (SMB t ) + βj3(adj. HMLt) + εjt
r jt  is the value-weighted monthly return of a designated portfolio.
r ft  is the monthly risk-free return proxied by the one-month Treasury bill, taken at the first day of 
the month.
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The overall R2 for the six portfolios, when compared to the original Fama-French 
model, are either higher or the same. However, the change in each case is near zero – 
with the largest change appearing in the big/high portfolio – with a difference in ∆R2 
0.016 between H1 and H2. While the overall R2 did increase, the marginal improvement 
in the model is not from the adjusted HML factor. The incremental improvement from 
the smaller 2-factor (market beta and SMB) and the 3-factor model (market beta, SMB, 
and HML) declined or remained equal in all cases. In other words, the small 
improvement in overall explanatory power is a result of higher ∆R2 in the SMB factor, 
likely due to the increase in the number of observations (healthy stocks with negative 
book values are concentrated in the “big” portfolios, which has significantly few 
observations). For example, for the big/medium portfolio, the overall R2 improved 0.005, 
but the HML factor for H1 produced an incremental R2 of 0.086, while the improvement 
in H2 is only 0.071.    
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 The relative contribution of the HML factor adjusted for the prepaid stock option 
asset over 5-year increments continues to show the fluctuation in relative importance. 
The HML factor was clearly a large portion of explanatory power around the internet 
bubble burst of 2000. While the incremental improvement of the HML factor is weakest 
∆R2 S/H S/M S/L B/H B/M B/L
1994-1999 0.100* 0.022* 0.012* 0.149* 0.035* 0.034*
1999-2004 0.322* 0.151* 0.003* 0.423* 0.211* 0.014*
2004-2009 0.069* 0.013* 0.006* 0.119* 0.007* 0.025*
2009-2014 0.056* 0.004* 0.009* 0.080* 0.006* 0.025*
2014-2019 0.076* 0.021* 0.027* 0.129* 0.014* 0.039*
SMB t  the difference in monthly, value-weighted returns of big stocks (market 
capitalization on June 30, t  greater than the median of the NYSE listed firm) and small 
stocks (market capitalization below the median of the NYSE listed stocks).
adj. HML t  the difference in monthly, value-weighted returns of stocks ranked high 
(top 30% of adjusted book equity for pre-paid option expense to market equity) and 
stocks ranked low (bottom 30% of adjusted book equity for pre-paid option expense 
to market equity).  Adjusted book equity was computed as the book value of 
shareholder's equity minus any reported book value of preferred equity plus the 
number of unexercised but outstanding stock options times the difference between the 
average price of repurchased at the end of fiscal year t-1 .  Market equity was 
measured on Dec 31, t-1 .
* p<0.05
Table 13: Incremental Validity of the HML Factor Book Value adjusted for the 
Capitalization of Repurchased Shares used to fund Stock Options (H2) by Five Year 
Periods
2 Factor Model: r jt  - r ft  = αj  + βj1 (r mt -r ft ) + βj2 (SMB t ) + εjt
3 Factor Model: r jt  - r ft  = αj  + βj1 (r mt -r ft ) + βj2 (SMB t ) + βj3(adj. HMLt) + εjt
r jt  is the value-weighted monthly return of a designated portfolio.
r ft  is the monthly risk-free return proxied by the one-month Treasury bill, taken at the 
first day of the month.
r mt  is the value-weighted monthly return of all NYSE, AmEx, and NASDAQ stocks 
with at least two years of trading data and recorded book value.
The six portfolios were created from the cross section of the SMB and HML factors.  
Monthly value-weighted returns represent July t  to June t+1 .
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in the small/low portfolio – a proxy for small cap growth stocks -- (with a total ∆R2 of 
0.011 over the 25 year period), it is the most sustained incremental improvement over the 
original Fama-French HML Factor – increasing ∆R2 in two out of five 5-year period and 
only reducing it once (from 0.010 in 2009-2014 for H1 to 0.009 for H2). As the widely 
accepted Fama-French 3 Factor Model is the default baseline, the lack of sustained 
explanatory power for our prepaid stock option asset suggests that our adjustment does 
not improve the original model. The ∆R2 for H1’s replicated original Fama-French 3-
Factor Model (M=0.0784, SD= 0.1014) suggest that is statistically better than H2’s 3-
Factor Model adjusted for prepaid stock option asset (M= 0.0734, SD= .0981), t (29) = 
2.26, p=0.0315. Thus, H2 is rejected. 
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H3: HML Adjusted for Capitalization of Internally Generated Goodwill 
 
 
N Mean St. Dev T-Score
1994-2019
H1 105,857   2,026    9,691      
H3 106,814   2,329    11,430    -6.60
1994-1999
H1 22,858     483       2,006      
H3 23,208     480       2,001      0.15
1999-2004
H1 22,490     957       3,816      
H3 22,727     1,056    4,438      -2.54
2004-2009
H1 19,683     1,937    7,785      
H3 19,777     2,174    9,123      -2.78
2009-2014
H1 17,825     3,046    12,243    
H3 17,914     3,405    14,106    -2.57
2014-2019
H1 23,001     3,892    15,433    
H3 23,188     4,730    18,496    -5.29
Entire Sample
Table 14: Descriptive Statistics of Book Values used in the replication of the Fama-French 3-
Factor Model (H1) and the Book Value adjusted for the Capitalization of Internally Generated 
Goodwill (H3)
Book equity (H1) was computed by the book value of shareholder's equity minus any reported 
book value of preferred equity at the end of fiscal year t-1 . 
Book equity (H3) was computed as the book value of shareholder's equity minus any reported 
book value of preferred equity plus internally generated goodwill at the end of fiscal year t-1. 
Internally generated goodwill is calculated as the percentage of repurchased shares to shares 
issued (in treasury stock for treasury stock reporters or over the past 8 years for retirement 
accounting) multiplied by the difference of market value at December 31 t-1 and book value in FY 
t-1.
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H3 adjusts the Fama-French 3-Factor Model for the percent of internally 
generated goodwill (market equity – book equity on Dec. 31, t-1) asset recognized by 
comparing the percent of shares repurchased to total shares issued.  
 
This treatment resulted in an additional 957 observations (106,814 compared to 
105,857) due to formerly negative book value companies turning positive with the 
addition of the internally generated goodwill asset. The resulting mean of the sample set 
increased from $2.0 billion to $2.3 billion, a statistically significant increase, t (207,700) 
= -6.60, p<0.001. The change in means grew over time, with the average between 2004-
2009 increasing a statistically significant $237 million, t (38,559)=-2.78, p<0.01, and 
between 2014-2019 increasing $838 million, t(44,873)=-5.29, p<0.001. 
Internally Generated Goodwill XXXX
Treasury Stock XXXX
OR
Internally Generated Goodwill XXXX
Common Stock XXXX
Retained Earnings XXXX
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N Mean St. Dev t(BE/ME) N Mean St. Dev Min Max t(BE/ME) N Mean St. Dev Min Max t(BE/ME) N Mean St. Dev Min Max t(BE/ME)
1994-2019
H1 105,819 3.03 72.53 39,362 7.47 118.78 0.62 17,942.17 36,274 0.56 0.14 0.28 1.17 30,183 0.21 0.10 0.00 0.54
H3 106,805 3.09 74.22 -0.20 38,607 7.79 123.31 0.62 18,486.01 -0.36 34,934 0.61 0.14 0.31 1.22 -53.43 33,264 0.25 0.12 0.00 0.63 -41.87
1994-1999
H1 22,854   3.10 89.95 8,296   7.88 140.87 0.62 10,719.04 7,639   0.53 0.11 0.31 0.80 6,919   0.22 0.10 0.00 0.43
H3 23,208   3.22 87.16 -0.15 8,466   8.16 144.18 0.62 10,719.04 -0.13 7,715   0.53 0.11 0.31 0.80 -0.47 7,027   0.22 0.10 0.00 0.43 0.84
1999-2004
H1 22,484   4.76 126.83 8,856   11.43 201.92 0.75 17,942.17 7,612   0.61 0.14 0.35 0.91 6,016   0.21 0.11 0.00 0.46
H3 22,727   4.80 129.59 -0.03 8,875   11.56 207.20 0.79 18,486.01 -0.04 7,353   0.65 0.14 0.39 0.95 -20.05 6,499   0.25 0.12 0.00 0.52 -16.08
2004-2009
H1 19,673   2.46 25.82 6,628   6.58 44.20 0.63 2,072.52   7,043   0.50 0.09 0.33 0.73 6,002   0.21 0.09 0.00 0.36
H3 19,777   2.51 26.04 -0.21 6,289   7.03 45.85 0.69 2,091.12   -0.57 6,596   0.56 0.09 0.41 0.80 -43.01 6,892   0.26 0.11 0.00 0.44 -25.81
2009-2014
H1 17,815   2.35 19.70 7,007   5.22 31.19 0.77 1,300.71   5,873   0.66 0.17 0.39 1.17 4,935   0.26 0.12 0.00 0.54
H3 17,923   2.41 19.83 -0.30 6,972   5.31 31.31 0.82 1,300.71   -0.16 5,387   0.74 0.16 0.47 1.22 -25.75 5,555   0.32 0.14 0.00 0.63 -23.55
2014-2019
H1 22,993   2.29 20.76 8,575   5.53 33.75 0.64 1,164.59   8,107   0.50 0.13 0.28 0.87 6,311   0.18 0.08 0.00 0.34
H3 23,170   2.33 20.60 -0.19 8,005   5.96 34.97 0.74 1,164.59   -0.81 7,883   0.61 0.13 0.38 0.98 -50.69 7,291   0.23 0.11 0.00 0.47 -32.83
Internally generated goodwill is calculated as the percentage of repurchased shares to shares issued (in treasury stock for treasury stock reporters or over the past 8 years for retirement accounting) multiplied by the 
difference of market value at December 31 t-1 and book value in FY t-1.
Market equity was measured on Dec 31, t-1.
Portfolio buckets were created as high (top 30% of book equity to market equity), medium (middle 40% of book equity to market equity) and low (bottom 30% of book equity to market equity).  
Book equity (H1) was computed as the book value of shareholder's equity minus any reported book value of preferred equity at the end of fiscal year t-1. 
Table 15: Descriptive Statistics of Book Equity-to-Market Equity ratios of the original Fama-French 3-Factor Model (H1) and the Book Value adjusted for the Capitalization of Internally Generated Goodwill (H3)
Entire Sample High Medium Low
Book equity (H3) was computed as the book value of shareholder's equity minus any reported book value of preferred equity plus internally generated goodwill at the end of fiscal year t-1. 
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Per the t-scores in Table 15, there are no statically significant changes between 
the mean book-to-market values of the entire sample between H1 and H3. However, 
changes to the low portfolios, t (63,126 )= -41.871, p<0.001, and medium portfolios t 
(71,085)=-53.4255, p<0.001) did result in statically significant changes in the mean 
book-to-market values. Also, other than the high portfolios in 1999-2009, all portfolios 
had statically significant changes in mean book-to-market values after 1999.  
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The correlation between the HML Factor generated in H1 and H3 is very high, 
ranging from 0.949 in 2004-2009 to 0.999 in 1994-1999. The fluctuation in the 









SMB t  the difference in monthly, value-weighted returns of big stocks (market capitalization on 
June 30, t  greater than the median of the NYSE listed firm) and small stocks (market 
capitalization below the median of the NYSE listed stocks).
HML t  the difference in monthly, value-weighted returns of stocks ranked high (top 30% of 
book equity to market equity) and stocks ranked low (bottom 30% of book equity to market 
equity).  Book equity was computed by the book value of shareholder's equity minus any 
reported book value of preferred equity at the end of fiscal year t-1 .  Market equity was 
measured on Dec 31, t-1 .
adj. HML t  the difference in monthly, value-weighted returns of stocks ranked high (top 30% 
of adjusted book equity for the capitalization of internally generated goodwill to market equity) 
and stocks ranked low (bottom 30% of adjusted book equity for the capitalization of internally 
generated goodwill to market equity).  Adjusted book equity was computed as the book value 
of shareholder's equity minus any reported book value of preferred equity plus the percentage 
of repurchased shares to shares issued (in treasury stock for treasury stock reporters or over 
the past 8 years for retirement accounting) multiplied by the difference of market value at 
December 31 t-1 and book value in FY t-1.end of fiscal year t-1 .  Market equity was 
measured on Dec 31, t-1 .
Table 16: Correlations and Paired T-Tests of Betas of Factors in replication of Fama-French 3-
Factor Model (H1) vs. Book Value adjusted for the Capitalization of Internally Generated 
Goodwill (H3)
H1: r jt  - r ft  = αj  + βj1 (r mt -r ft ) + βj2 (SMB t ) + βj3(HMLt) + εjt
H3: r jt  - r ft  = αj  + βj1 (r mt -r ft ) + βj2 (SMB t ) + βj3(adj. HMLt) + εjt
r jt  is the value-weighted monthly return of a designated portfolio.
r ft  is the monthly risk-free return proxied by the one-month Treasury bill, taken at the first day 
of the month.
r mt  is the value-weighted monthly return of all NYSE, AmEx, and NASDAQ stocks with at 
least two years of trading data and recorded book value.
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increased amount of internally generated goodwill over time. A paired T-test shows no 
statistically significant changes in the results by 5-year period.  
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Small Big High Small Big
High 0.979 1.011 High 100.58 67.56
Mid 0.970 0.944 Mid 88.12 52.20
Low 1.013 0.976 Low 66.41 91.52
Small Big Small Big
High 0.844 0.001 High 62.62 0.05
Mid 0.796 -0.144 Mid 48.08 -5.74
Low 1.027 -0.181 Low 48.57 -12.26
Small Big Small Big
High 0.735 0.746 High 53.74 35.47
Mid 0.378 0.430 Mid 22.43 16.92
Low -0.265 -0.255 Low -12.35 -16.98
Small Big Small Big
High 0.983 0.943 High 0.0068 0.0105
Mid 0.965 0.902 Mid 0.0099 0.0126
Low 0.974 0.972 Low 0.0107 0.0075
r mt  is the value-weighted monthly return of all NYSE, AmEx, and NASDAQ stocks with at 
least two years of trading data and recorded book value.
SMB t  the difference in monthly, value-weighted returns of big stocks (market capitalization on 
June 30, t  greater than the median of the NYSE listed firm) and small stocks (market 
capitalization below the median of the NYSE listed stocks).
adj. HML t  the difference in monthly, value-weighted returns of stocks ranked high (top 30% 
of adjusted book equity for the capitalization of internally generated goodwill to market equity) 
and stocks ranked low (bottom 30% of adjusted book equity for the capitalization of internally 
generated goodwill to market equity).  Adjusted book equity was computed as the book value 
of shareholder's equity minus any reported book value of preferred equity plus the percentage 
of repurchased shares to shares issued (in treasury stock for treasury stock reporters or over 
the past 8 years for retirement accounting) multiplied by the difference of market value at 
December 31 t-1 and book value in FY t-1.end of fiscal year t-1 .  Market equity was 
measured on Dec 31, t-1 .
The six portfolios were created from the cross section of the SMB and HML factors.  Monthly 
value-weighted returns represent July t  to June t+1 .
R2 and the standard error are adjusted for degrees of freedom.
Table 17: Results of regressions of monthly returns on six portfolio on excess market returns, 
size and book-to-market factors from July 1994 to June 2019 with the Book Value adjusted 
for the Capitalization of Internally Generated Goodwill (H3)
 r jt  - r ft  = αj  + βj1 (r mt -r ft ) + βj2 (SMB t ) + βj3(adj. HMLt) + εjt
r jt  is the value-weighted monthly return of a designated portfolio.
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Table 17 presents the multiple regression results of the Fama-French 3-Factor 
Model adjusted for the capitalization of internally generated goodwill and the six 
resulting portfolios. The three factors continue to explain a significant portion of the 
variance of all six portfolios (with an adjusted R2 ranging from a low of 0.902 for the 
big/medium portfolio to a high of 0.983 for the small/high portfolio). The market beta 
coefficient was statistically significant in all cases with a range of t (299) = 52.20, 
p<0.001 for the big/medium portfolio to a high of t (299) = 100.58, p<0.001 for the 
small/high portfolio. The market beta co-efficient hovered near 1 for all portfolios. The 
SMB variable was statically significant for all portfolios at the 95% level, except the 
big/high portfolio. The coefficient for the SMB factor was large and positive for the small 
portfolios, but small and negative for the big portfolios suggesting that the factor does 
successfully capture the difference in the variation of returns by size. Finally, the HML 
factor was statically significant for all six portfolios. The coefficient was significant and 
positive for the high portfolios and went down incrementally, turning negative for the low 
portfolios. This relationship remains consistent with the argument that HML captures the 
risk factor difference between the high book-to-market portfolios (value stocks) and low 
book-to-market portfolios (growth stocks). 
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2 Factor 3 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor
R2 0.813 0.983 R2 0.702 0.943
∆R2 0.169 ∆R2 0.24
F 2888.425 F 1257.957
p-value 0 p-value 0
2 Factor 3 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor
R2 0.898 0.965 R2 0.807 0.902
∆R2 0.067 ∆R2 0.094
F 565.246 F 286.232
p-value 0 p-value 0
2 Factor 3 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor
R2 0.960 0.974 R2 0.946 0.972
∆R2 0.013 ∆R2 0.027
F 152.579 F 288.347
p-value 0 p-value 0
S/M B/M
Table 18: Incremental Validity of the HML Factor with the Book Value 
adjusted for the Capitalizaiton of Internally Generated Goodwill (H3)
2 Factor Model: r jt  - r ft  = αj  + βj1 (r mt -r ft ) + βj2 (SMB t ) + εjt
3 Factor Model: r jt  - r ft  = αj  + βj1 (r mt -r ft ) + βj2 (SMB t ) + βj3(adj. HMLt) + εjt
S/H B/H
The six portfolios were created from the cross section of the SMB and HML 
factors.  Monthly value-weighted returns represent July t  to June t+1 .
R
2
 is adjusted for degrees of freedom.
adj. HMLt  the difference in monthly, value-weighted returns of stocks ranked 
high (top 30% of adjusted book equity for the capitalization of internally 
generated goodwill to market equity) and stocks ranked low (bottom 30% of 
adjusted book equity for the capitalization of internally generated goodwill to 
market equity).  Adjusted book equity was computed as the book value of 
shareholder's equity minus any reported book value of preferred equity plus the 
percentage of repurchased shares to shares issued (in treasury stock for 
treasury stock reporters or over the past 8 years for retirement accounting) 
multiplied by the difference of market value at December 31 t-1 and book value 
in FY t-1.end of fiscal year t-1 .  Market equity was measured on Dec 31, t-1 .
S/L B/L
r jt  is the value-weighted monthly return of a designated portfolio.
r ft  is the monthly risk-free return proxied by the one-month Treasury bill, taken 
at the first day of the month.
r mt  is the value-weighted monthly return of all NYSE, AmEx, and NASDAQ 
stocks with at least two years of trading data and recorded book value.
SMB t  the difference in monthly, value-weighted returns of big stocks (market 
capitalization on June 30, t  greater than the median of the NYSE listed firm) 
and small stocks (market capitalization below the median of the NYSE listed 
stocks).
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The R2 for the small/medium portfolio is the only measure unchanged from H1’s 
replication of the Fama-French 3-Factor Model. However, the incremental R2 dropped 
from 0.070 for H1 to 0.067 for H3. The R2 for small/high, big/medium and big/low 
portfolios dropped less than 0.01, with incremental R2 decreasing for the small/high and 
big/low portfolios, but actually increasing for the big/medium portfolio compared to H1. 
The remaining two portfolios showed improved R2 results. The small/low portfolio saw a 
small increase in R2 from 0.972 in H1 to 0.974 H3, with the incremental R2 increasing 
from 0.010 to 0.013. The big/high portfolio also saw a small increase in R2 from 0.942 in 
H1 to 0.943 in H3. However, the incremental contribution of the HML factor dropped 
from 0.267 in H1 to 0.240 in H3. These results are consistent with the findings of H2, and 
suggest that the added number of “big” observations improves the explanatory power of 
the SMB factor in the “big” portfolios.   
 
∆R2 S/H S/M S/L B/H B/M B/L
1994-1999 0.106* 0.024* 0.008* 0.202* 0.036* 0.037*
1999-2004 0.347* 0.149* 0.003* 0.382* 0.288* 0.020*
2004-2009 0.054* 0.013* 0.015* 0.074* 0.020* 0.028*
2009-2014 0.056* 0.002* 0.013* 0.078* 0.003* 0.024*
2014-2019 0.047* 0.020* 0.033* 0.096* 0.012* 0.050*
* p<0.05
SMB t  the difference in monthly, value-weighted returns of big stocks (market capitalization on June 
adj. HML t  the difference in monthly, value-weighted returns of stocks ranked high (top 30% of 
The six portfolios were created from the cross section of the SMB and HML factors.  Monthly 
Table 19: Change in R2 with the addition of HML with Book Valueadjusted for  the Capitalization 
of Internally Generated Goodwill (H3) by 5-year period. 
2 Factor Model: r jt  - r ft  = αj  + βj1 (r mt -r ft ) + βj2 (SMB t ) + εjt
3 Factor Model: r jt  - r ft  = αj  + βj1 (r mt -r ft ) + βj2 (SMB t ) + βj3(adj. HMLt) + εjt
r jt  is the value-weighted monthly return of a designated portfolio.
r ft  is the monthly risk-free return proxied by the one-month Treasury bill, taken at the first day of 
r mt  is the value-weighted monthly return of all NYSE, AmEx, and NASDAQ stocks with at least 
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 The relative contribution of the HML factor adjusted for the internally generated 
goodwill asset over 5-year increments continues to demonstrate the fluctuation in relative 
importance. The HML factor explains a large portion of the overall variance of the high 
and medium portfolios during the internet bubble years, although not as much as the 
original Fama-French model (for instance from 1999-2004, H1’s ∆R2 0.412 for the 
big/high portfolio compared to H3’s 0.382). Incremental improvement of the HML factor 
continues to be the weakest in small/low portfolio but is also the most sustained 
incremental improvement over the original Fama-French HML Factor – increasing ∆R2 in 
every 5-year periods. While marginal improvement is found in certain portfolios, the ∆R2 
for H3 (M= 0.075, SD= .100), is not statistically different from the replicated Fama-
French 3-Factor model (M=0.078, SD= 0.101), t (29) = 1.30, p=0.201. Since there is not 
a statistically significant improvement over the baseline model, H3 is not supported. 
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H4: HML Adjusted for Hypothesized Cash-Acquisition Asset 
 
H4 record the value of net repurchased shares as an asset rather than as contra-
equity. The following is the journal entries. 
N Mean St. Dev T-Score
1994-2019
H1 105,857   2,026    9,691      
H4 107,327   2,872    15,116    -15.40
1994-1999
H1 22,858     483       2,006      
H4 23,225     487       2,016      -0.19
1999-2004
H1 22,490     957       3,816      
H4 22,760     1,483    9,906      -7.47
2004-2009
H1 19,683     1,937    7,785      
H4 19,902     3,457    16,869    -11.53
2009-2014
H1 17,825     3,046    12,243    
H4 18,053     4,195    17,468    -7.22
2014-2019
H1 23,001     3,892    15,433    
H4 23,387     5,073    21,386    -6.83
Table 20: Descriptive Statistics of Book Values used in the replication of the Fama-French 3-
Factor Model (H1) and the Book Value adjusted for the Cash Acquisition Value of Repurchased 
Shares (H4)
Book equity (H1) was computed by the book value of shareholder's equity minus any reported 
book value of preferred equity at the end of fiscal year t-1 . 
Book equity (H4) was computed as the book value of shareholder's equity minus any reported 
book value of preferred equity plus value of net shares repurchased at the end of fiscal year t-1. 
Value of net shares repurchased at the end of fiscial year t-1 is either the book value of treasury 
stock or the net share retired from t-1 to t-8 multiplied by the weighted average price of shares 
over the period.
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The adjustment to book value for the cash value of repurchased shares had the 
largest impact of any hypothesis, increasing the number of positive book value 
observations to 107,327, a 1,470 increase in n. The resulting mean book value of the full 
sample set increased from $2.0 billion to $2.9 billion, a statistically significant increase, t 
(183,165) = -15.40, p<0.001. The average book value grew a statistically significant 
$1.15 billion, t (32,369) = -7.22, p<0.001, between 2009 and 2014 and an even larger 
$1.2 billion, t (42,573) = -6.83, p<0.001, between 2014 and 2019.  
Treasury Stock Asset XXXX
Treasury Stock XXXX
OR
Treasury Stock Asset XXXX
Common Stock XXXX
Retained Earnings XXXX
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Table 21: Descriptive Statistics of Book-to-Market ratios of the original Fama-French 3-Factor Model (H1) and the BV adjusted for the Cash Acquisition Value of Repurchased Shares (H4)
N Mean St. Dev t(BE/ME) N Mean St. Dev Min Max t(BE/ME) N Mean St. Dev Min Max t(BE/ME) N Mean St. Dev Min Max t(BE/ME)
1994-2019
H1 105,819 3.03 72.53 39,362 7.47 118.78 0.62 17,942.17 36,274 0.56 0.14 0.28 1.17 30,183 0.21 0.10 0.00 0.54
H4 107,326 3.54 75.33 -1.58 41,627 8.37   120.81 0.63 18,622.20 (1.07)    36,587 0.65 0.18 0.32 1.51 -81.89 29,112 0.25 0.13 0.00 0.70 -41.03
1994-1999
H1 22,854   3.10 89.95 8,296   7.88 140.87 0.62 10,719.04 7,639   0.53 0.11 0.31 0.80 6,919   0.22 0.10 0.00 0.43
H4 23,225   3.23 87.13 -0.16 8,320   8.32   145.45 0.63 10,719.04 (0.20)    7,801   0.54 0.11 0.32 0.82 -6.56 7,104   0.22 0.10 0.00 0.43 -1.86
1999-2004
H1 22,484   4.76 126.83 8,856   11.43 201.92 0.75 17,942.17 7,612   0.61 0.14 0.35 0.91 6,016   0.21 0.11 0.00 0.46
H4 22,760   5.01 130.44 -0.20 8,838   12.13 209.14 0.78 18,622.20 (0.23)    7,939   0.68 0.17 0.36 1.12 -31.23 5,983   0.24 0.13 0.00 0.55 -13.86
2004-2009
H1 19,673   2.46 25.82 6,628   6.58 44.20 0.63 2,072.52   7,043   0.50 0.09 0.33 0.73 6,002   0.21 0.09 0.00 0.36
H4 19,902   3.25 29.94 -2.80 7,330   7.99   48.97   0.83 2,072.61   (1.79)    7,159   0.64 0.13 0.41 0.97 -76.75 5,413   0.27 0.11 0.00 0.45 -29.23
2009-2014
H1 17,815   2.35 19.70 7,007   5.22 31.19 0.77 1,300.71   5,873   0.66 0.17 0.39 1.17 4,935   0.26 0.12 0.00 0.54
H4 18,053   3.14 25.24 -3.33 7,733   6.51   38.30   0.95 1,881.27   (2.25)    5,726   0.84 0.21 0.48 1.51 -48.83 4,594   0.34 0.16 0.00 0.70 -27.03
2014-2019
H1 22,993   2.29 20.76 8,575   5.53 33.75 0.64 1,164.59   8,107   0.50 0.13 0.28 0.87 6,311   0.18 0.08 0.00 0.34
H4 23,386   2.97 26.27 -3.10 9,406   6.72   41.14   0.77 1,275.77   (2.14)    7,962   0.62 0.15 0.35 1.00 -49.69 6,018   0.22 0.10 0.00 0.43 -26.71
Portfolio buckets were created as high (top 30% of book equity to market equity), medium (middle 40% of book equity to market equity) and low (bottom 30% of book equity to market equity).  
Book equity (H1) was computed by the book value of shareholder's equity minus any reported book value of preferred equity at the end of fiscal year t-1 . 
Book equity (H4) was computed as the book value of shareholder's equity minus any reported book value of preferred equity plus value of net shares repurchased at the end of fiscal year t-1. 
Value of net shares repurchased at the end of fiscial year t-1 is either the book value of treasury stock or the net share retired from t-1 to t-8 multiplied by the weighted average price of shares over the period.
Entire Sample High Medium Low
Market equity was measured on Dec 31, t-1.
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The significant increase in the book values of many companies resulted in 
meaningfully higher average book-to-market value in all the medium portfolios and all 
the low portfolios except for 1994-1999. Additionally, the high portfolios from 2009-
2019 also saw a statistically significant increase in the mean book-to-market values. The 
number of firms with a high book-to-market ratio increased significantly, while the 
number of firms in the low portfolios dropped in all cases except 1994-1999.  
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H4 resulted in the lowest average correlation of any hypothesis with H1, at 0.851 
for the 25-year period. However, the lower results are concentrated in a relatively short 
Correlatio







SMB t  the difference in monthly, value-weighted returns of big stocks (market 
capitalization on June 30, t  greater than the median of the NYSE listed firm) and small 
stocks (market capitalization below the median of the NYSE listed stocks).
HML t  the difference in monthly, value-weighted returns of stocks ranked high (top 30% 
of book equity to market equity) and stocks ranked low (bottom 30% of book equity to 
market equity).  Book equity was computed by the book value of shareholder's equity 
minus any reported book value of preferred equity at the end of fiscal year t-1 .  Market 
equity was measured on Dec 31, t-1 .
adj. HML t  the difference in monthly, value-weighted returns of stocks ranked high (top 
30% of adjusted book equity for the cash acquisition value of repurchased shares to 
market equity) and stocks ranked low (bottom 30% of adjusted book equity for the 
cash acquisition value of repurchased shares to market equity).  Adjusted book equity 
was computed as the book value of shareholder's equity minus any reported book value 
of preferred equity plus the value of net shares repurchased at the end of fiscal year t-1 
(either the book value of treasury stock or the net share retired from t-1  to t-8 
multiplied by the weighted average price of shares over the period) at the end of fiscal 
year t-1 .  Market equity was measured on Dec 31, t-1 .
Table 22: Correlations and Paired T-Tests of Betas of Factors in replication of Fama-
French 3-Factor Model (H1) vs. Book Value adjusted for the Cash Acquisition Value 
of Repurchased Shares (H4)
H1: r jt  - r ft  = αj  + βj1 (r mt -r ft ) + βj2 (SMB t ) + βj3(HMLt) + εjt
H4: r jt  - r ft  = αj  + βj1 (r mt -r ft ) + βj2 (SMB t ) + βj3(adj. HMLt) + εjt
r jt  is the value-weighted monthly return of a designated portfolio.
r ft  is the monthly risk-free return proxied by the one-month Treasury bill, taken at the 
first day of the month.
r mt  is the value-weighted monthly return of all NYSE, AmEx, and NASDAQ stocks 
with at least two years of trading data and recorded book value.
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time – 2001 to 2006 when the July-June correlations were -0.21, -.027, 0.40, 0.34, -0.29, 
-0.27, respectfully. Starting in July 2006, the correlations quickly rebound. The t-test 
show that despite the lower correlation, the average return was not statistically different.  
Market View of Share Repurchases  96 
 
Small Big Small Big Big
High 0.963 1.049 High 108.35 52.48 52.48
Mid 0.918 0.993 Mid 79.08 52.47 52.47
Low 1.086 0.925 Low 55.91 85.17 85.17
Small Big Small Big Big
High 0.837 -0.040 High 68.27 -1.46 -1.46
Mid 0.791 -0.185 Mid 49.38 -7.09 -7.09
Low 0.971 -0.174 Low 36.23 -11.63 -11.63
Small Big Small Big Big
High 0.705 0.802 High 49.27 24.92 24.92
Mid 0.395 0.263 Mid 21.15 8.61 8.61
Low -0.265 -0.229 Low -8.46 -13.08 -13.08
Small Big Small Big Big
High 0.985 0.912 High 0.0071 0.0146 0.0146
Mid 0.972 0.902 Mid 0.0085 0.0138 0.0138
Low 0.953 0.964 Low 0.0142 0.0079 0.0079
Table 23: Results of regressions of monthly returns on six portfolio on excess market returns, 
size and book-to-market factors from July 1994 to June 2019 adjusted for the Cash 
Acqusition for Repurchased Shares (H4)
 r jt  - r ft  = αj  + βj1 (r mt -r ft ) + βj2 (SMB t ) + βj3(adj. HMLt) + εjt
r jt  is the value-weighted monthly return of a designated portfolio.






The six portfolios were created from the cross section of the SMB and HML factors.  Monthly 
value-weighted returns represent July t  to June t+1 .
R2 and the standard error are adjusted for degrees of freedom.
r mt  is the value-weighted monthly return of all NYSE, AmEx, and NASDAQ stocks with at 
least two years of trading data and recorded book value.
SMB t  the difference in monthly, value-weighted returns of big stocks (market capitalization on 
June 30, t  greater than the median of the NYSE listed firm) and small stocks (market 
capitalization below the median of the NYSE listed stocks).
adj. HML t  the difference in monthly, value-weighted returns of stocks ranked high (top 30% 
of adjusted book equity for the cash acquisition value of repurchased shares to market equity) 
and stocks ranked low (bottom 30% of adjusted book equity for the cash acquisition value of 
repurchased shares to market equity).  Adjusted book equity was computed as the book value 
of shareholder's equity minus any reported book value of preferred equity plus the value of net 
shares repurchased at the end of fiscial year t-1 (either the book value of treasury stock or the 
net share retired from t-1  to t-8  multiplied by the weighted average price of shares over the 
period) at the end of fiscal year t-1 .  Market equity was measured on Dec 31, t-1 .
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The Fama-French 3-Factor model adjusted for the repurchased shares cash 
acquisition asset has statistical significance for all three factors across all six portfolios. 
The market beta factor coefficients hovers near 1.0 but has a wider spread than the 
replicated Fama-French traditional model – with a range of 0.918 to 1.086 for H4 
compared to 0.948 to 1.032 for H1. All market beta coefficients were statistically 
significant with a low t (299) = 52.47, p<0.001 for the big/medium portfolio to a high of t 
(299) = 108.35, p<0.001 for the small/high portfolio. All SMB coefficients were also 
statistically significant, with coefficients positive, averaging 0.866 for the small 
portfolios and -0.133 for big portfolios, supporting the factor’s ability to distinguish 
differences based on size. The HML coefficient was statistically significant in all 
portfolios and with a step down in the value of the coefficients as the level of the book-
to-market value decreased – arguing the factor successfully captures risk associated with 
valuation of the stock. The overall R2 of the regressions shows a high level of explanatory 
power, ranging from 0.902 for the big/medium portfolio to a high of 0.985 for the 
small/high portfolio.  
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2 Factor 3 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor
R2 0.863 0.985 R2 0.729 0.912
∆R2 0.122 ∆R2 0.183
F 2427.999 F 620.987
p-value 0 p-value 0
2 Factor 3 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor
R2 0.929 0.972 R2 0.878 0.902
∆R2 0.042 ∆R2 0.024
F 447.317 F 74.217
p-value 0 p-value 0
2 Factor 3 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor
R2 0.941 0.953 R2 0.943 0.964
∆R2 0.011 ∆R2 0.021
F 71.607 F 171.08
p-value 0 p-value 0
r jt  is the value-weighted monthly return of a designated portfolio.
r ft  is the monthly risk-free return proxied by the one-month Treasury bill, taken at the first day of the month.
r mt  is the value-weighted monthly return of all NYSE, AmEx, and NASDAQ stocks with at least two years of trading 
data and recorded book value.
SMB t  the difference in monthly, value-weighted returns of big stocks (market capitalization on June 30, t  greater than 
the median of the NYSE listed firm) and small stocks (market capitalization below the median of the NYSE listed 
stocks).
adj. HML t  the difference in monthly, value-weighted returns of stocks ranked high (top 30% of adjusted book equity 
for the cash acquisition value of repurchased shares to market equity) and stocks ranked low (bottom 30% of adjusted 
book equity for the cash acquisition value of repurchased shares to market equity).  Adjusted book equity was 
computed as the book value of shareholder's equity minus any reported book value of preferred equity plus the value 
of net shares repurchased at the end of fiscial year t-1 (either the book value of treasury stock or the net share retired 
from t-1  to t-8  multiplied by the weighted average price of shares over the period) at the end of fiscal year t-1 .  
Market equity was measured on Dec 31, t-1 .
The six portfolios were created from the cross section of the SMB and HML factors.  Monthly value-weighted returns 
represent July t  to June t+1 .
R2 is adjusted for degrees of freedom.
Table 24: Incremental Validity of the HML Factor with Book Value adjusted for the Cash Acqusition Asset (H4)
2 Factor Model: r jt  - r ft  = αj  + βj1 (r mt -r ft ) + βj2 (SMB t ) + εjt
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 The re-sorting of the portfolios based on the adjustment for an asset reflecting 
amounts available for a future acquisition resulted in lower R2 for the 3-factor model with 
only the small/medium portfolio increasing more than 0.001.  Similarly, lower ∆R2 are 
found for the HML factor, but the adjustment did lead to a significant increase in the R2 
for the 2-factor model (with just market beta and SMB). This is likely the result of the 
significantly higher number of “big” companies recognized in the adjusted model. For the 
small/high portfolio, the R2 for the 3-factor model increased from 0.984 in H1 to 0.985 
for H4, but the incremental R2 from HML declined from 0.179 to 0.122. Instead, the 2-
Factor model R2 improved from 0.804 in H1 to 0.863 in H4. The data for the 
small/medium portfolio is similar. Total R2 improved to 0.972 from 0.965, while the 
incremental R2 declined from 0.070 to 0.042. The two-factor model’s R2 grew from 0.895 
in H1 to 0.929 in H4. The small/low portfolio saw a decline in R2 for both the two and 
three factor models, but the ∆R2 increased from 0.010 in H1 to 0.011 in H4. The big/high 
and big/medium portfolio trends were similar, with an improvement in the 2-factor 
model, but slightly lower overall R2 resulting in a lower ∆R2 for the HML factor. Finally, 
the big/low portfolio saw declines in all metrics. 
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 The relative contribution of the HML factor with book value adjusted for the cash 
acquisition of repurchased shares asset over 5-year increments continues shows different 
time periods of importance and strength between the portfolios. Incremental R2 is lowest 
in the low book-to-market portfolios and grows as the book-to-market value increases. 
The adjusted HML factor does not explain as much of the overall variance of the high 
book-to-market and medium book-to-market portfolios during the internet bubble years 
∆R2 S/H S/M S/L B/H B/M B/L
1994-1999 0.104* 0.023* 0.008* 0.193* 0.037* 0.035*
1999-2004 0.255* 0.105* 0.001* 0.303* 0.032* 0.019*
2004-2009 0.019* 0.003* 0.009* 0.023* 0.004* 0.013*
2009-2014 0.036* 0.003* 0.008* 0.073* 0.001 0.022*
2014-2019 0.039* 0.016* 0.031* 0.068* 0.004* 0.028*
r jt  is the value-weighted monthly return of a designated portfolio.
r ft  is the monthly risk-free return proxied by the one-month Treasury bill, taken at the first day of the 
month.
r mt  is the value-weighted monthly return of all NYSE, AmEx, and NASDAQ stocks with at least two 
years of trading data and recorded book value.
SMB t  the difference in monthly, value-weighted returns of big stocks (market capitalization on June 
30, t  greater than the median of the NYSE listed firm) and small stocks (market capitalization below 
the median of the NYSE listed stocks).
adj. HML t  the difference in monthly, value-weighted returns of stocks ranked high (top 30% of 
adjusted book equity for the cash acquisition value of repurchased shares to market equity) and stocks 
ranked low (bottom 30% of adjusted book equity for the cash acquisition value of repurchased shares 
to market equity).  Adjusted book equity was computed as the book value of shareholder's equity 
minus any reported book value of preferred equity plus the value of net shares repurchased at the end 
of fiscial year t-1 (either the book value of treasury stock or the net share retired from t-1  to t-8 
multiplied by the weighted average price of shares over the period) at the end of fiscal year t-1 .  
Market equity was measured on Dec 31, t-1 .
The six portfolios were created from the cross section of the SMB and HML factors.  Monthly value-
weighted returns represent July t  to June t+1 .
* p<0.05
Table 25: Change in R2 with the addition of HML Book Balue adjusted for the Cash Acqusition Asset 
(H4) by 5-year period. 
2 Factor Model: r jt  - r ft  = αj  + βj1 (r mt -r ft ) + βj2 (SMB t ) + εjt
3 Factor Model: r jt  - r ft  = αj  + βj1 (r mt -r ft ) + βj2 (SMB t ) + βj3(adj. HMLt) + εjt
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as the replicated Fama-French model (for instance from 1999-2004, H1’s ∆R2 0.412 for 
the big/high portfolio compared to H4’s 0.303. Overall, the ∆R2 for H4 (M=0.051, SD= 
.074) is statistically worse than H1 (M=0.078, SD=0.101), t (29) = 3.26, p=0.0029. It 
lowers the overall explanatory power of the entire model and the incremental explanatory 
factor of HML in H4 relative to the baseline replicated original Fama-French 3-Factor 
model. Thus, H4 is not supported. 
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H5: HML Adjusted for Put Option Value of Share Repurchases 
 
By capitalizing the put option value of re-issuing treasury stock and adding it to 
book value, the mean book value of H5 increased by $22 million to $3,133 million, 
increasing the number of positive book value observations to 56,500, an increase in n of 
46. Here is the journal entry to show the manipulation:  
Treasury Stock Put Option   XXXX 
  Treasury Stock       XXXX 
The sample time for H5 is much shorter at only 14 years. Information needed to 
perform the Black-Scholes model to calculate the put option value was not disclosed until 
N Mean St. Dev T-Score
2005-2019
H1 56,454  3,110    12,794  
H5 56,500  3,133    12,839  -0.30
2005-2009
H1 15,685  2,045    8,239    
H5 15,690  2,049    8,247    -0.02
2009-2014
H1 17,805  3,040    12,243  
H5 17,815  3,064    12,312  -0.19
2014-2019
H1 22,964  3,892    15,442  
H5 22,994  3,925    15,484  -0.23
Entire Sample
Table 26: Descriptive Statistics of Book Values used in the replication of the Fama-French 3-
Factor Model (H1) and the Book Value adjusted for the Put Option Value of Treasury Shares 
(H5)
Book equity (H1) was computed by the book value of shareholder's equity minus any reported 
book value of preferred equity at the end of fiscal year t-1 . 
Book equity (H5) was computed as the book value of shareholder's equity minus any reported 
book value of preferred equity plus the Black and Scholes model value of the put option to re-
sell Treasury Shares at the end of fiscal year t-1. 
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FY2003/2004 depending on the company. The 70 basis point increase in the mean of the 
average book value is not statistically significant, t (112,951) = -0.30, p=0.382.  
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Table 27: Descriptive Statistics of Book-to-Market ratios of the original Fama-French 3-Factor Model (H1) and the BV adjusted for the Put Option of Treasury Shares (H5)
N Mean St. Devt(BE/ME) N Mean St. Dev Min Max t(BE/ME) N Mean St. Dev Min Max t(BE/ME) N Mean St. Dev Min Max t(BE/ME)
2005-2019
H1 56,454 2.28 21.66 20,865 5.49 35.40 0.63 2072.52 19,623 0.55 0.15 0.03 1.17 15,996 0.213 0.103 0.000 0.535
H5 56,499 2.29 21.71 -0.03 20,914 5.49 35.46 0.63 18622.20 -0.003 19,477 0.55 0.15 0.28 1.17 -2.56 16,108 0.216 0.104 0.000 0.536 2.231
2005-2009
H1 15,685 2.20 24.82 5,323   5.76 42.39 0.63 2072.52 5,644   0.49 0.10 0.03 0.73 4,768   0.211 0.087 0.000 0.351
H5 19,353 2.32 24.71 -0.01 5,334   5.76 42.62 0.63 2093.61 -0.003 6,843   0.49 0.17 0.33 1.17 -1.59 5,334   0.230 0.107 0.000 0.536 4.893
2009-2014
H1 17,805 2.35 19.70 7,003   5.23 31.20 0.77 1300.71 5,888   0.66 0.17 0.39 1.17 4,919   0.261 0.120 0.000 0.535
H5 17,815 2.35 19.71 -0.02 7,012   5.23 31.19 0.77 1300.71 -0.096 5,854   0.67 0.17 0.39 1.17 -1.19 4,949   0.265 0.120 0.000 0.536 -1.682
2014-2019
H1 22,964 2.29 20.77 8,559   5.54 33.78 0.64 1164.59 8,096   0.51 0.13 0.28 0.87 6,310   0.177 0.084 0.000 0.622
H5 22,993 2.29 20.78 -0.02 8,568   5.54 33.79 0.65 1164.59 -0.011 8,042   0.51 0.13 0.28 0.87 -2.30 6,384   0.181 0.085 0.000 0.435 -3.151
Book equity (H1) was computed by the book value of shareholder's equity minus any reported book value of preferred equity at the end of fiscal year t-1 . 
Book equity (H5) was computed as the book value of shareholder's equity minus any reported book value of preferred equity plus the Black Scholes model value of the put option to re-sell 
Treasury Shares at the end of fiscal year t-1. 
Market equity was measured on Dec 31, t-1.
Portfolio buckets were created as high (top 30% of book equity to market equity), medium (middle 40% of book equity to market equity) and low (bottom 30% of book equity to market 
equity).  
Entire Sample High Medium Low
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Small differences seen in the mean book-to-market ratios are nonetheless 
statistically significant for the full sample set in the medium and low portfolios, but not 
necessarily in each five-year increment. Overall, the adjustment of adding the put value 
of treasury shares did not move the book value mean of the entire sample in a statistically 
significant way t (112,951) = -0.03, p=0.975 or move the mean of any high portfolio. 
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 The relatively small size of the put option asset and small number of new 
observations makes this adjustment almost meaningless. The correlation between the 
HML factors for H1 and H5 is nearly perfectly positive. The t-score reveals no statistical 







SMB t  the difference in monthly, value-weighted returns of big stocks (market 
capitalization on June 30, t  greater than the median of the NYSE listed firm) and small 
stocks (market capitalization below the median of the NYSE listed stocks).
HML t  the difference in monthly, value-weighted returns of stocks ranked high (top 30% 
of book equity to market equity) and stocks ranked low (bottom 30% of book equity to 
market equity).  Book equity was computed by the book value of shareholder's equity 
minus any reported book value of preferred equity at the end of fiscal year t-1 .  Market 
equity was measured on Dec 31, t-1 .
adj. HML t  the difference in monthly, value-weighted returns of stocks ranked high (top 
30% of adjusted book equity for the put option value of treasury shares to market equity) 
and stocks ranked low (bottom 30% of adjusted book equity for the put option value of 
treasury shares to market equity).  Adjusted book equity was computed as the book 
value of shareholder's equity minus any reported book value of preferred equity plus the 
Black Scholes model value of the put option to re-sell Treasury Shares at market value at 
the end of fiscal year t-1.   Market equity was measured on Dec 31, t-1 .
Table 28: Correlations and Paired T-Tests of Betas of Factors in replication of Fama-
French 3-Factor Model (H1) vs. Book Value adjusted for the Put Option value of 
Treasury Stock (H5)
H1: r jt  - r ft  = αj  + βj1 (r mt -r ft ) + βj2 (SMB t ) + βj3(HMLt) + εjt
H5: r jt  - r ft  = αj  + βj1 (r mt -r ft ) + βj2 (SMB t ) + βj3(adj. HMLt) + εjt
r jt  is the value-weighted monthly return of a designated portfolio.
r ft  is the monthly risk-free return proxied by the one-month Treasury bill, taken at the 
first day of the month.
r mt  is the value-weighted monthly return of all NYSE, AmEx, and NASDAQ stocks 
with at least two years of trading data and recorded book value.
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Small Big Small Big
High 0.954 1.054 High 93.58 51.75
Mid 0.983 0.985 Mid 71.76 60.95
Low 1.056 0.952 Low 56.70 85.41
Small Big Small Big
High 0.890 -0.025 High 47.14 -0.66
Mid 0.888 -0.122 Mid 34.99 -4.07
Low 0.970 -0.105 Low 28.13 -5.09
Small Big Small Big
High 0.656 0.753 High 37.42 21.50
Mid 0.252 0.167 Mid 10.71 6.01
Low -0.289 -0.301 Low -9.03 -15.71
Small Big Small Big
High 0.992 0.961 High 0.005 0.010
Mid 0.984 0.963 Mid 0.007 0.008
Low 0.972 0.979 Low 0.009 0.006
r ft  is the monthly risk-free return proxied by the one-month Treasury bill, taken at the first 
day of the month.
r mt  is the value-weighted monthly return of all NYSE, AmEx, and NASDAQ stocks with 
at least two years of trading data and recorded book value.
SMB t  the difference in monthly, value-weighted returns of big stocks (market capitalization 
on June 30, t  greater than the median of the NYSE listed firm) and small stocks (market 
capitalization below the median of the NYSE listed stocks).
adj. HML t  the difference in monthly, value-weighted returns of stocks ranked high (top 
30% of adjusted book equity for the put option value of treasury shares to market equity) 
and stocks ranked low (bottom 30% of adjusted book equity for the put option value of 
treasury shares to market equity).  Adjusted book equity was computed as the book value 
of shareholder's equity minus any reported book value of preferred equity plus the Black 
Scholes model value of the put option to re-sell Treasury Shares at market value at the end 
of fiscal year t-1.   Market equity was measured on Dec 31, t-1 .
The six portfolios were created from the cross section of the SMB and HML factors.  
Monthly value-weighted returns represent July t  to June t+1 .





Table 29: Results of regressions of monthly returns on six portfolio on excess market 
returns, size factor and book-to-market factors from July 2005 to June 2019 adjusted for 
the Put Option Asset of Treasury Shares (H5)
 r jt  - r ft  = αj  + βj1 (r mt -r ft ) + βj2 (SMB t ) + βj3(adj. HMLt) + εjt
r jt  is the value-weighted monthly return of a designated portfolio.
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 Table 29 shows the results of the multiple regression performed with the adjusted 
factors for the put option asset value related to treasury stock. The results are as expected 
and due to the time change (2005-2019 for H5 compared to 1994-2019 for the similar 
tables for the other four hypotheses), show the Fama-French 3-Factor model has a higher 
adjusted R2 in recent times. The three factors together explained a significant portion of 
the variance of all six portfolios (ranging from a low of 0.961 for the big/high portfolio to 
a high of 0.992 for the small/high portfolio). The market beta coefficient was statistically 
significant in all cases with a range t (164) = 51.75, p<0.001 for the big/high portfolio to 
a high of t (164) =93.58, p<0.001 for the small/high portfolio. The market beta 
coefficient hovered near 1 for all portfolios. The SMB variable was statically significant 
for all portfolio at the 95% level except for the big/high portfolio. The coefficient for the 
SMB factor was large and positive for the small portfolios, but small and negative for the 
big portfolios suggesting that the factor does successfully capture the difference in the 
variation of returns by size. Finally, the HML factor was statically significant for all six 
portfolios. The coefficient was meaningful and positive for the high book-to-market 
portfolios and went down incrementally, turning negative for the low book-to-market 
portfolios. This relationship is consistent with the suggestion that HML captures the risk 
factor difference between the high book-to-market portfolios (value stocks) and low 
book-to-market portfolios (growth stocks). 
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Table 30 confirms that HML’s addition to the model does improve its explanatory 
power by a statistically significant amount for each of the six portfolios, with ∆R2 
ranging from 0.008 for the big/medium portfolio to a high of 0.108 for the big/high 
portfolio. The results are almost identical for every portfolio, with a small difference 
2 Factor 3 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor
R2 0.921 0.992 R2 0.852 0.961
∆R2 0.07 ∆R2 0.108
F 1400.256 F 462.085
p-value 0 p-value 0
2 Factor 3 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor
R2 0.972 0.984 R2 0.956 0.963
∆R2 0.011 ∆R2 0.008
F 114.736 F 36.157
p-value 0 p-value 0
2 Factor 3 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor
R2 0.958 0.972 R2 0.949 0.979
∆R2 0.014 ∆R2 0.03
F 81.482 F 246.817
p-value 0 p-value 0
r mt  is the value-weighted monthly return of all NYSE, AmEx, and NASDAQ stocks with at least 
SMB t  the difference in monthly, value-weighted returns of big stocks (market capitalization on 
adj. HML t  the difference in monthly, value-weighted returns of stocks ranked high (top 30% of 
The six portfolios were created from the cross section of the SMB and HML factors.  Monthly 
R2 is adjusted for degrees of freedom.
Table 30: Incremental Validity of the HML Factor with the Book Value adjusted for the Put Option 
Asset of Treasury Shares (H5)
2 Factor Model: r jt  - r ft  = αj  + βj1 (r mt -r ft ) + βj2 (SMB t ) + εjt
3 Factor Model: r jt  - r ft  = αj  + βj1 (r mt -r ft ) + βj2 (SMB t ) + βj3(adj. HMLt) + εjt
r jt  is the value-weighted monthly return of a designated portfolio.
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noted in the big/medium portfolio. For that portfolio, the 3-factor R2 increased from 
0.959 in H1 to 0.963 in H5, but the ∆R2 declined from 0.012 in H1 to 0.008 in H5.  
 
The relative contribution of the HML factor adjusted for the hypothesized put 
option asset of treasury stock over 5-year increments shows small but meaningful 
contributions throughout all six portfolios from 2005 to 2019. Incremental R2 is lowest in 
the medium book-to-market portfolios. However, the adjusted HML factor is not 
statistically different from the replicated Fama-French 3-Factor Model, which is the 
baseline. In a paired T-test of the ∆R2 for H5 (M=0.040, SD= .038), the results are not 
∆R2 S/H S/M S/L B/H B/M B/L
2005-2009 0.070* 0.012* 0.005* 0.113* 0.006* 0.022*
2009-2014 0.059* 0.004* 0.010* 0.084* 0.005* 0.025*
2014-2019 0.073* 0.021* 0.027* 0.124* 0.015* 0.040*
SMB t  the difference in monthly, value-weighted returns of big stocks (market capitalization on June 
30, t  greater than the median of the NYSE listed firm) and small stocks (market capitalization 
below the median of the NYSE listed stocks).
adj. HML t  the difference in monthly, value-weighted returns of stocks ranked high (top 30% of 
adjusted book equity for the put option value of treasury shares to market equity) and stocks 
ranked low (bottom 30% of adjusted book equity for the put option value of treasury shares to 
market equity).  Adjusted book equity was computed as the book value of shareholder's equity 
minus any reported book value of preferred equity plus the Black Scholes model value of the put 
option to re-sell Treasury Shares at market value at the end of fiscal year t-1.   Market equity was 
measured on Dec 31, t-1 .
* p<0.05
Table 31: Change in R2 with the addition of HML with Book Value adjusted for the Put Option 
Asset of Treasury Shares (H5) by 5-year period.
2 Factor Model: r jt  - r ft  = αj  + βj1 (r mt -r ft ) + βj2 (SMB t ) + εjt
3 Factor Model: r jt  - r ft  = αj  + βj1 (r mt -r ft ) + βj2 (SMB t ) + βj3(adj. HMLt) + εjt
r jt  is the value-weighted monthly return of a designated portfolio.
r ft  is the monthly risk-free return proxied by the one-month Treasury bill, taken at the first day of 
the month.
r mt  is the value-weighted monthly return of all NYSE, AmEx, and NASDAQ stocks with at least 
two years of trading data and recorded book value.
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statistically different from H1 (M=0.040, SD=0.040), t (17) = -1.4, p=0.176. Thus, H5 is 
not supported since it did not improve the explanatory power of the model. 
 
H1: Replicated Fama-French 3-Factor Model 
 Since the replicated Fama-French model, representing the return of capital 
treatment of repurchased shares either was better or statistically equivalent to all other 
hypothesized treatments H1 is supported.  
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Industry-Level Data
 
Table 32a: Industry Level Adjusted R2 for each hypthosis
H1 (Replicated Fama-French 3 Factor): r jt  - r ft  = αj  + βj1 (r mt -r ft ) + βj2 (SMB t ) + βj3(HMLt) + εjt
H2 (Fama French adjusted for Prepaid Stock Options): r jt  - r ft  = αj  + βj1 (r mt -r ft ) + βj2 (SMB t ) + βj3(adj. HMLt2) + εjt
H3 (Fama French adjusted for Internally Generated Goodwill): r jt  - r ft  = αj  + βj1 (r mt -r ft ) + βj2 (SMB t ) + βj3(adj. HMLt3) + εjt
H4 (Fama French adjusted for Cash Acqusition Asset): r jt  - r ft  = αj  + βj1 (r mt -r ft ) + βj2 (SMB t ) + βj3(adj. HMLt4) + εjt
H5 (Fama French adjusted for Put Option repuchased shares): r jt  - r ft  = αj  + βj1 (r mt -r ft ) + βj2 (SMB t ) + βj3(adj. HMLt5) + εjt
R2 for each regression, all p<0.001  * notes p < 0.05 for HML variable, ** for p < 0.01 for HML variable
Food1994-20192005-20192014-2019 Hshld1979-20192005-20192014-2019 Cnstr1979-20192005-20192014-2019
H1 44.6%** 57.8% 47.6% H1 41.6%** 52.4% 43.0% H1 74.0%** 84.0%** 82.7%
H2 44.2%** 57.9% 47.7% H2 41.4%** 52.5% 42.9% H2 73.9%** 84.0%** 82.7%
H3 45.8%** 58.0% 47.8% H3 42.2%** 52.6% 42.4% H3 74.3%** 84.1%* 82.8%
H4 39.4%** 58.0% 47.8% H4 39.7%* 52.6% 43.6% H4 72.7%** 84.3%* 82.6%
H5 57.8% 47.9% H5 52.5% 42.9% H5 84.0%** 82.7%
Beer1994-20192005-20192014-2019 Clothes1994-20192005-20192014-2019 Steel1994-20192005-20192014-2019
H1 27.8%* 44.3% 44.8% H1 52.7%** 60.1% 43.0% H1 67.7%** 67.8% 59.7%**
H2 27.4%* 44.4% 45.0% H2 52.5%** 60.1% 42.9% H2 67.7%** 67.8% 59.8%**
H3 29.1%* 44.1% 45.1% H3 53.0%** 60.1% 42.4% H3 67.7%** 67.7% 58.9%**
H4 24.8%* 44.8%* 45.7% H4 53.1%** 60.0% 43.6% H4 67.4%* 68.0% 57.3%*
H5 44.3% 44.9% H5 60.1% 42.9% H5 67.8% 59.5%**
Smoke1994-20192005-20192014-2019 Health1994-20192005-20192014-2019 FabPr1994-20192005-20192014-2019
H1 14.2%** 28.0% 23.9% H1 48.1% 63.9%** 71.1%** H1 75.4%** 79.8% 77.5%**
H2 14.2%** 28.1% 24.2% H2 48.0% 64.0%** 71.1%** H2 75.4%** 79.8% 77.5%**
H3 14.7%** 28.2% 25.3% H3 48.4% 63.9%** 69.1%** H3 75.5%** 79.8% 77.8%**
H4 12.1%** 28.1% 25.2% H4 47.7% 63.8%** 76.2%** H4 75.6%** 80.1% 77.1%**
H5 28.0% 24.1% H5 64.0%** 71.2%** H5 79.8% 77.5%**
H3: adj. HML t3  the difference in monthly, value-weighted returns of stocks ranked high (top 30% of adjusted book equity for the capitalization of 
internally generated goodwill to market equity) and stocks ranked low (bottom 30% of adjusted book equity for the capitalization of internally 
generated goodwill to market equity).  Adjusted book equity was computed as the book value of shareholder's equity minus any reported book value 
of preferred equity plus the percentage of repurchased shares to shares issued (in treasury stock for treasury stock reporters or over the past 8 years 
for retirement accounting) multiplied by the difference of market value at December 31 t-1 and book value in FY t-1.end of fiscal year t-1 .  Market 
equity was measured on Dec 31, t-1 .
H4: adj. HML t4  the difference in monthly, value-weighted returns of stocks ranked high (top 30% of adjusted book equity for the cash acquisition 
value of repurchased shares to market equity) and stocks ranked low (bottom 30% of adjusted book equity for the cash acquisition value of 
repurchased shares to market equity).  Adjusted book equity was computed as the book value of shareholder's equity minus any reported book 
value of preferred equity plus the value of net shares repurchased at the end of fiscial year t-1 (either the book value of treasury stock or the net share 
retired from t-1  to t-8  multiplied by the weighted average price of shares over the period) at the end of fiscal year t-1 .  Market equity was 
measured on Dec 31, t-1 .
H5: adj. HML t5  the difference in monthly, value-weighted returns of stocks ranked high (top 30% of adjusted book equity for the put option value 
of treasury shares to market equity) and stocks ranked low (bottom 30% of adjusted book equity for the put option value of treasury shares to 
market equity).  Adjusted book equity was computed as the book value of shareholder's equity minus any reported book value of preferred equity 
plus the Black Scholes model value of the put option to re-sell Treasury Shares at market value at the end of fiscal year t-1.   Market equity was 
measured on Dec 31, t-1 .
R2 is adjusted for degrees of freedom.
r jt  is the value-weighted monthly return of a designated portfolio.
r ft  is the monthly risk-free return proxied by the one-month Treasury bill, taken at the first day of the month.
r mt  is the value-weighted monthly return of all NYSE, AmEx, and NASDAQ stocks with at least two years of trading data and recorded book 
SMB t  the difference in monthly, value-weighted returns of big stocks (market capitalization on June 30, t  greater than the median of the NYSE 
listed firm) and small stocks (market capitalization below the median of the NYSE listed stocks).
H1: HML t  the difference in monthly, value-weighted returns of stocks ranked high (top 30% of book equity to market equity) and stocks ranked 
low (bottom 30% of book equity to market equity).  Book equity was comuted by the book value of shareholder's equity minus any reported book 
value of preferred equity at the end of fiscal year t-1 .  Market equity was measured on Dec 31, t-1 .
H2: adj. HML t2  the difference in monthly, value-weighted returns of stocks ranked high (top 30% of adjusted book equity for pre-paid option 
expense to market equity) and stocks ranked low (bottom 30% of adjusted book equity for pre-paid option expense to market equity).  Adjusted 
book equity was computed as the book value of shareholder's equity minus any reported book value of preferred equity plus the number of 
unexercised but outstanding stock options times the difference between the average price of repurchased at the end of fiscal year t-1 .  Market equity 
was measured on Dec 31, t-1 .
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Table 32b: Industry Level Adjusted R2 for each hypthosis
H1 (Replicated Fama-French 3 Factor): r jt  - r ft  = αj  + βj1 (r mt -r ft ) + βj2 (SMB t ) + βj3(HMLt) + εjt
H2 (Fama French adjusted for Prepaid Stock Options): r jt  - r ft  = αj  + βj1 (r mt -r ft ) + βj2 (SMB t ) + βj3(adj. HMLt2) + εjt
H3 (Fama French adjusted for Internally Generated Goodwill): r jt  - r ft  = αj  + βj1 (r mt -r ft ) + βj2 (SMB t ) + βj3(adj. HMLt3) + εjt
H4 (Fama French adjusted for Cash Acqusition Asset): r jt  - r ft  = αj  + βj1 (r mt -r ft ) + βj2 (SMB t ) + βj3(adj. HMLt4) + εjt
H5 (Fama French adjusted for Put Option repuchased shares): r jt  - r ft  = αj  + βj1 (r mt -r ft ) + βj2 (SMB t ) + βj3(adj. HMLt5) + εjt
R2 for each regression, all p<0.001  * notes p < 0.05 for HML variable, ** for p < 0.01 for HML variable
Carry 1979-2019 2005-2019 2014-2019 Telcm 1979-2019 2005-2019 2014-2019 Whlsl 1979-2019 2005-2019 2014-2019
H1 62.1%** 74.1% 64.6% H1 64.9% 72.6% 58.0% H1 70.6%** 86.1%* 82.2%
H2 62.0%** 74.1% 64.7% H2 65.0% 72.5% 58.1% H2 70.7%** 86.1%* 82.2%
H3 63.0%** 74.2% 64.7% H3 64.8% 73.2% 59.0% H3 71.0%** 86.0%* 82.3%
H4 60.7%** 74.0% 64.3% H4 65.1% 72.3% 55.0% H4 69.8%** 86.0%* 82.6%
H5 74.1% 64.7% H5 72.6% 58.1% H5 86.0%* 82.1%
Mines 1994-2019 2005-2019 2014-2019 Servs 1994-2019 2005-2019 2014-2019 Rtail 1994-2019 2005-2019 2014-2019
H1 30.7%** 36.2% 28.9%* H1 85.8%** 84.0%** 84.0%** H1 59.9% 69.0%* 74.0%**
H2 30.8%** 36.2% 29.1%* H2 85.7%** 86.1%** 84.1%** H2 59.9% 69.2%* 74.1%**
H3 31.1%** 36.2% 28.7%* H3 85.9%** 86.3%** 84.9%** H3 60.0% 68.7% 73.9%**
H4 28.7%* 36.8% 25.7% H4 81.1%** 83.5%** 82.5%* H4 60.1% 68.3% 75.8%**
H5 36.2% 28.7%* H5 86.2%** 84.1%** H5 69.0%* 74.1%**
Coal 1994-2019 2005-2019 2014-2019 BusEq 1994-2019 2005-2019 2014-2019 Meals 1994-2019 2005-2019 2014-2019
H1 19.0%** 22.2% 12.1% H1 80.4%** 82.2%** 74.7%** H1 50.9%** 63.4% 52.3%
H2 19.0%** 22.2% 12.1% H2 79.7%** 82.0%** 74.6%** H2 50.7%** 63.4% 52.4%
H3 18.5%** 22.0% 9.9% H3 80.7%** 82.5%** 76.1%** H3 52.1%** 63.1% 52.3%
H4 18.1%* 22.5% 10.9% H4 72.1%** 78.1% 69.6% H4 51.0%** 63.1% 52.7%
H5 22.2% 11.8% H5 82.2%** 74.7%** H5 63.4% 52.4%
H4: adj. HML t4  the difference in monthly, value-weighted returns of stocks ranked high (top 30% of adjusted book equity for the cash acquisition value of repurchased shares to 
market equity) and stocks ranked low (bottom 30% of adjusted book equity for the cash acquisition value of repurchased shares to market equity).  Adjusted book equity was 
computed as the book value of shareholder's equity minus any reported book value of preferred equity plus the value of net shares repurchased at the end of fiscial year t-1 (either 
the book value of treasury stock or the net share retired from t-1  to t-8  multiplied by the weighted average price of shares over the period) at the end of fiscal year t-1 .  Market 
equity was measured on Dec 31, t-1 .
H5: adj. HML t5  the difference in monthly, value-weighted returns of stocks ranked high (top 30% of adjusted book equity for the put option value of treasury shares to market 
equity) and stocks ranked low (bottom 30% of adjusted book equity for the put option value of treasury shares to market equity).  Adjusted book equity was computed as the 
book value of shareholder's equity minus any reported book value of preferred equity plus the Black Scholes model value of the put option to re-sell Treasury Shares at market 
value at the end of fiscal year t-1.   Market equity was measured on Dec 31, t-1 .
R2 is adjusted for degrees of freedom.
r jt  is the value-weighted monthly return of a designated portfolio.
r ft  is the monthly risk-free return proxied by the one-month Treasury bill, taken at the first day of the month.
r mt  is the value-weighted monthly return of all NYSE, AmEx, and NASDAQ stocks with at least two years of trading data and recorded book value.
SMB t  the difference in monthly, value-weighted returns of big stocks (market capitalization on June 30, t  greater than the median of the NYSE listed firm) and small stocks 
(market capitalization below the median of the NYSE listed stocks).
H1: HML t  the difference in monthly, value-weighted returns of stocks ranked high (top 30% of book equity to market equity) and stocks ranked low (bottom 30% of book 
equity to market equity).  Book equity was comuted by the book value of shareholder's equity minus any reported book value of preferred equity at the end of fiscal year t-1 .  
Market equity was measured on Dec 31, t-1 .
H2: adj. HML t2  the difference in monthly, value-weighted returns of stocks ranked high (top 30% of adjusted book equity for pre-paid option expense to market equity) and 
stocks ranked low (bottom 30% of adjusted book equity for pre-paid option expense to market equity).  Adjusted book equity was computed as the book value of shareholder's 
equity minus any reported book value of preferred equity plus the number of unexercised but outstanding stock options times the difference between the average price of 
repurchased at the end of fiscal year t-1 .  Market equity was measured on Dec 31, t-1 .
H3: adj. HML t3  the difference in monthly, value-weighted returns of stocks ranked high (top 30% of adjusted book equity for the capitalization of internally generated goodwill to 
market equity) and stocks ranked low (bottom 30% of adjusted book equity for the capitalization of internally generated goodwill to market equity).  Adjusted book equity was 
computed as the book value of shareholder's equity minus any reported book value of preferred equity plus the percentage of repurchased shares to shares issued (in treasury 
stock for treasury stock reporters or over the past 8 years for retirement accounting) multiplied by the difference of market value at December 31 t-1 and book value in FY t-
1.end of fiscal year t-1 .  Market equity was measured on Dec 31, t-1 .
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Table 32c: Industry Level Adjusted R2 for each hypthosis
H1 (Replicated Fama-French 3 Factor): r jt  - r ft  = αj  + βj1 (r mt -r ft ) + βj2 (SMB t ) + βj3(HMLt) + εjt
H2 (Fama French adjusted for Prepaid Stock Options): r jt  - r ft  = αj  + βj1 (r mt -r ft ) + βj2 (SMB t ) + βj3(adj. HMLt2) + εjt
H3 (Fama French adjusted for Internally Generated Goodwill): r jt  - r ft  = αj  + βj1 (r mt -r ft ) + βj2 (SMB t ) + βj3(adj. HMLt3) + εjt
H4 (Fama French adjusted for Cash Acqusition Asset): r jt  - r ft  = αj  + βj1 (r mt -r ft ) + βj2 (SMB t ) + βj3(adj. HMLt4) + εjt
H5 (Fama French adjusted for Put Option repuchased shares): r jt  - r ft  = αj  + βj1 (r mt -r ft ) + βj2 (SMB t ) + βj3(adj. HMLt5) + εjt
R2 for each regression, all p<0.001  * notes p < 0.05 for HML variable, ** for p < 0.01 for HML variable
Games1994-2019 2005-2019 2014-2019 Chems 1994-20192005-2019 2014-2019 ElcEq 1994-2019 2005-2019 2014-2019
H1 64.8%** 69.8% 58.0%* H1 68.4%** 77.3% 73.0% H1 72.3%** 80.5% 81.6%
H2 64.7%** 69.8% 58.0%* H2 67.9%** 77.3% 72.9% H2 72.3%** 80.5% 81.6%
H3 64.7%** 69.8% 59.0%* H3 68.5%** 77.3% 73.5% H3 72.4%** 80.3% 81.9%
H4 65.1%** 69.8% 57.2% H4 67.3%** 77.3% 72.7% H4 72.4%** 80.6% 81.9%
H5 70.6% 58.1%* H5 77.3% 73.0% H5 80.5% 81.7%
Books1994-2019 2005-2019 2014-2019 Txtils 1994-20192005-2019 2014-2019 Autos 1994-2019 2005-2019 2014-2019
H1 68.7%** 75.7%** 73.0%* H1 57.2%** 60.6%** 72.6% H1 60.8%** 68.1%* 68.7%*
H2 68.4%** 75.5%** 73.1%* H2 56.4%** 60.3%** 72.5% H2 60.7%** 68.0%* 68.7%*
H3 68.7%** 76.0%** 73.5%* H3 56.8%** 60.4%** 73.2% H3 61.2%** 68.2%* 68.8%*
H4 66.0%** 75.0%* 72.4% H4 55.8%** 59.9%** 72.2% H4 61.6%** 68.1% 69.3%**
H5 75.6%** 73.0%* H5 60.6%** 72.6% H5 68.1%* 68.6%*
Oil1994-2019 2005-2019 2014-2019 Paper 1994-20192005-2019 2014-2019 Fin 1994-2019 2005-2019 2014-2019
H1 44.3%** 49.5% 62.0%** H1 67.3%** 79.4% 75.0% H1 85.1%** 87.1%** 84.0%**
H2 44.0%** 49.6% 62.0%** H2 66.8%** 79.4% 75.0% H2 85.0%** 87.2%** 83.8%**
H3 44.9%** 50.0%* 62.0%** H3 68.1%** 79.5% 74.9% H3 84.1%** 85.8%** 83.2%**
H4 38.7%** 48.4% 59.6%** H4 65.8%** 79.3% 75.2% H4 81.0%** 84.7%** 82.9%**
H5 49.5% 62.0%** H5 79.4% 75.0% H5 84.7%** 83.9%**
H4: adj. HML t4  the difference in monthly, value-weighted returns of stocks ranked high (top 30% of adjusted book equity for the cash acquisition value of 
repurchased shares to market equity) and stocks ranked low (bottom 30% of adjusted book equity for the cash acquisition value of repurchased shares to 
market equity).  Adjusted book equity was computed as the book value of shareholder's equity minus any reported book value of preferred equity plus the 
value of net shares repurchased at the end of fiscial year t-1 (either the book value of treasury stock or the net share retired from t-1  to t-8  multiplied by the 
weighted average price of shares over the period) at the end of fiscal year t-1 .  Market equity was measured on Dec 31, t-1 .
H5: adj. HML t5  the difference in monthly, value-weighted returns of stocks ranked high (top 30% of adjusted book equity for the put option value of 
treasury shares to market equity) and stocks ranked low (bottom 30% of adjusted book equity for the put option value of treasury shares to market equity).  
Adjusted book equity was computed as the book value of shareholder's equity minus any reported book value of preferred equity plus the Black Scholes 
model value of the put option to re-sell Treasury Shares at market value at the end of fiscal year t-1.   Market equity was measured on Dec 31, t-1 .
R2 is adjusted for degrees of freedom.
r jt  is the value-weighted monthly return of a designated portfolio.
r ft  is the monthly risk-free return proxied by the one-month Treasury bill, taken at the first day of the month.
r mt  is the value-weighted monthly return of all NYSE, AmEx, and NASDAQ stocks with at least two years of trading data and recorded book value.
SMB t  the difference in monthly, value-weighted returns of big stocks (market capitalization on June 30, t  greater than the median of the NYSE listed firm) 
and small stocks (market capitalization below the median of the NYSE listed stocks).
H1: HML t  the difference in monthly, value-weighted returns of stocks ranked high (top 30% of book equity to market equity) and stocks ranked low 
(bottom 30% of book equity to market equity).  Book equity was comuted by the book value of shareholder's equity minus any reported book value of 
preferred equity at the end of fiscal year t-1 .  Market equity was measured on Dec 31, t-1 .
H2: adj. HML t2  the difference in monthly, value-weighted returns of stocks ranked high (top 30% of adjusted book equity for pre-paid option expense to 
market equity) and stocks ranked low (bottom 30% of adjusted book equity for pre-paid option expense to market equity).  Adjusted book equity was 
computed as the book value of shareholder's equity minus any reported book value of preferred equity plus the number of unexercised but outstanding stock 
options times the difference between the average price of repurchased at the end of fiscal year t-1 .  Market equity was measured on Dec 31, t-1 .
H3: adj. HML t3  the difference in monthly, value-weighted returns of stocks ranked high (top 30% of adjusted book equity for the capitalization of internally 
generated goodwill to market equity) and stocks ranked low (bottom 30% of adjusted book equity for the capitalization of internally generated goodwill to 
market equity).  Adjusted book equity was computed as the book value of shareholder's equity minus any reported book value of preferred equity plus the 
percentage of repurchased shares to shares issued (in treasury stock for treasury stock reporters or over the past 8 years for retirement accounting) multiplied 
by the difference of market value at December 31 t-1 and book value in FY t-1.end of fiscal year t-1 .  Market equity was measured on Dec 31, t-1 .
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Table 32d: Industry Level Adjusted R2 for each hypthosis
H1 (Replicated Fama-French 3 Factor): r jt  - r ft  = αj  + βj1 (r mt -r ft ) + βj2 (SMB t ) + βj3(HMLt) + εjt
H2 (Fama French adjusted for Prepaid Stock Options): r jt  - r ft  = αj  + βj1 (r mt -r ft ) + βj2 (SMB t ) + βj3(adj. HMLt2) + εjt
H3 (Fama French adjusted for Internally Generated Goodwill): r jt  - r ft  = αj  + βj1 (r mt -r ft ) + βj2 (SMB t ) + βj3(adj. HMLt3) + εjt
H4 (Fama French adjusted for Cash Acqusition Asset): r jt  - r ft  = αj  + βj1 (r mt -r ft ) + βj2 (SMB t ) + βj3(adj. HMLt4) + εjt
H5 (Fama French adjusted for Put Option repuchased shares): r jt  - r ft  = αj  + βj1 (r mt -r ft ) + βj2 (SMB t ) + βj3(adj. HMLt5) + εjt
R2 for each regression, all p<0.001  * notes p < 0.05 for HML variable, ** for p < 0.01 for HML variable
Util1994-2019 2005-2019 2014-2019 Trans1994-2019 2005-2019 2014-2019 Other 1994-2019 2005-2019 2014-2019
H1 31.5%** 33.4% 10.5%* H1 66.3%** 73.5%* 71.8% H1 60.0%** 75.8%** 76.0%**
H2 30.6%** 33.4% 10.5%* H2 66.3%** 73.2%* 71.8% H2 59.6%** 75.3%** 76.0%**
H3 31.3%** 33.5% 10.5%* H3 67.0%** 73.4%* 72.2% H3 59.8%** 75.2%** 77.4%**
H4 27.0%** 33.5% 10.6% H4 67.4%** 73.5%* 71.2% H4 58.5%** 72.9%** 72.9%*
H5 33.4% 10.5%* H5 73.2%* 71.7% H5 75.8%** 76.1%**
H4: adj. HML t4  the difference in monthly, value-weighted returns of stocks ranked high (top 30% of adjusted book equity for the cash acquisition value of 
repurchased shares to market equity) and stocks ranked low (bottom 30% of adjusted book equity for the cash acquisition value of repurchased shares to market 
equity).  Adjusted book equity was computed as the book value of shareholder's equity minus any reported book value of preferred equity plus the value of net shares 
repurchased at the end of fiscial year t-1 (either the book value of treasury stock or the net share retired from t-1  to t-8  multiplied by the weighted average price of 
shares over the period) at the end of fiscal year t-1 .  Market equity was measured on Dec 31, t-1 .
H5: adj. HML t5  the difference in monthly, value-weighted returns of stocks ranked high (top 30% of adjusted book equity for the put option value of treasury shares 
to market equity) and stocks ranked low (bottom 30% of adjusted book equity for the put option value of treasury shares to market equity).  Adjusted book equity 
was computed as the book value of shareholder's equity minus any reported book value of preferred equity plus the Black Scholes model value of the put option to re-
sell Treasury Shares at market value at the end of fiscal year t-1.   Market equity was measured on Dec 31, t-1 .
R2 is adjusted for degrees of freedom.
r jt  is the value-weighted monthly return of a designated portfolio.
r ft  is the monthly risk-free return proxied by the one-month Treasury bill, taken at the first day of the month.
r mt  is the value-weighted monthly return of all NYSE, AmEx, and NASDAQ stocks with at least two years of trading data and recorded book value.
SMB t  the difference in monthly, value-weighted returns of big stocks (market capitalization on June 30, t  greater than the median of the NYSE listed firm) and small 
stocks (market capitalization below the median of the NYSE listed stocks).
H1: HML t  the difference in monthly, value-weighted returns of stocks ranked high (top 30% of book equity to market equity) and stocks ranked low (bottom 30% 
of book equity to market equity).  Book equity was comuted by the book value of shareholder's equity minus any reported book value of preferred equity at the end 
of fiscal year t-1 .  Market equity was measured on Dec 31, t-1 .
H2: adj. HML t2  the difference in monthly, value-weighted returns of stocks ranked high (top 30% of adjusted book equity for pre-paid option expense to market 
equity) and stocks ranked low (bottom 30% of adjusted book equity for pre-paid option expense to market equity).  Adjusted book equity was computed as the 
book value of shareholder's equity minus any reported book value of preferred equity plus the number of unexercised but outstanding stock options times the 
difference between the average price of repurchased at the end of fiscal year t-1 .  Market equity was measured on Dec 31, t-1 .
H3: adj. HML t3  the difference in monthly, value-weighted returns of stocks ranked high (top 30% of adjusted book equity for the capitalization of internally 
generated goodwill to market equity) and stocks ranked low (bottom 30% of adjusted book equity for the capitalization of internally generated goodwill to market 
equity).  Adjusted book equity was computed as the book value of shareholder's equity minus any reported book value of preferred equity plus the percentage of 
repurchased shares to shares issued (in treasury stock for treasury stock reporters or over the past 8 years for retirement accounting) multiplied by the difference of 
market value at December 31 t-1 and book value in FY t-1.end of fiscal year t-1 .  Market equity was measured on Dec 31, t-1 .
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While the data for market-wide data suggests that none of the hypothesized 
treatments of repurchased shares dominate, industry-data shows a slightly different story. 
Using French’s data for 30 industries (French, 2021), multiple regression for the five of 
the hypothesized treatments of share repurchases from 1994-2019, 2005-2019 and 2014-
2019. For the 1994-2019 period, the HML factor was a non-statistically significant 
variable in 3 of the 30 industries across all hypotheses (Beer, Telecom, and Retail). From 
2005-2019, HML was not statically significant in 16 of the 30 industries across all 5 
hypotheses (Food, Smoke, Games, Chemicals, Clothes, Household, Steel, Fabrication 
Production, Electrical Equipment, Utilities, Coal, Mines, Carry, Telecom, Paper, and 
Meals). Finally, from 2014-2019, 16 industries were not statistically significant at the 5% 
level (Food, Beer, Smoke, Household, Clothes, Textiles, Chemicals, Electric Equipment, 
Construction, Carry, Coal, Telecom, Paper, Transportation, Meals, and Wholesale).  
For most industries, the relative change in the explanatory power of the of various 
hypothesis varied minorly. However, for one industry in the most recent period, H4 (book 
value adjusted for the cash asset value of repurchased shares), dominated the other 
hypotheses. In the Health industry, the adjusted R2 for the cash asset value of repurchased 
shares was 76.2%, compared to a range of 69.1% to 71.2% for the remaining hypothesis. 
The incremental R2 for the HML variable was .133 from .628 for the two-factor 
regression (market beta and SMB) to .762 (market beta, SMB and HML). This is a 
significant improvement over the Fama-French 3-Factor replication when the two-factor 
model explained 62.7% of the variability of returns and the 3-Factor model explained 
71.1% of the variability of returns, a change in R2 of 0.086. As the Healthcare industry is 
one of the most active in the mergers and acquisition market with more than 12,000 
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acquisitions between 2014-2019 (Institute of Mergers, Acquisitions, and Alliances, 
2021), the implication that share repurchases are treated like a cash-like asset is 
meaningful.  
H4 also was noticeably better for the Auto and Retail industries in the most recent 
period. As the most active repurchasers of shares for both of these industries are “older 
technology” (brick and mortar for retail and combustion engines for auto), this is an 
interesting finding without an easy explanation.  
Finally, both Books (mainly publishing companies) and the catch-all “Other” 
industry show more than 1% improvement under the capitalization of internally 
generated goodwill hypothesis H3 in the most recent period. Correspondingly, the asset 
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Chapter 5: Discussion 
Two Aspects of the Study 
 This study is relevant to both accounting and finance. From a finance perspective, 
this study explores the possibility that excessive share repurchase activity caused 
measurement problems in the HML factor within the Fama-French 3-Factor Model. More 
importantly, the study addresses how to correct the measurement problem. From an 
accounting point of view, this study serves to inform the question of market perception of 
treasury stock transactions, which should drive the accounting for the transaction.  First, I 
will discuss the finance implications and results. Finally, I will discuss the accounting 
perspective. 
 
The Variability of HML 
 The HML factor's influence on the explanatory ability of the Fama-French 3-
Factor Model has fluctuated dramatically over the past twenty-five years. The factor is 
incrementally more critical in explaining value portfolios (high book-to-market 
portfolios) with an average incremental R2 of 0.223 from 1994-2019 than growth 
portfolios (low book-to-market portfolios), which had an average incremental R2 of .020 
across the 25 years. HML's role in explaining portfolio returns fluctuated significantly, 
with a low of 0.031 from 2009-2014 across the six portfolios to a high of 0.194 during 
1999-2004. The dot-com bubble and its subsequent recovery resulted in vastly different 
returns between growth and value companies, and the HML factor became highly 
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influential in explaining the resulting returns. These results show that the HML factor is 
necessary to explain the difference between value and growth companies.  
 
HML and Share Repurchases 
 Unlike dividends, which come with an implicit promise to continue and can signal 
maturation of the company's growth prospects, share repurchases are a more flexible 
form of returning cash to shareholders. Share repurchases are widespread across both 
value and growth stocks. In 2018, 53% of all companies and 89% of the S&P 500 
engaged in share repurchase activity (Zeng & Luk, 2020). Additionally, based on 
Standard & Poor's buyback index and its labeling style methodology, value stocks tended 
to be only slightly more active in repurchasing shares – representing on average 56% of 
the index between 1996 and 2020 (Zeng & Luk, 2020).    
 For the Fama-French method of distinguishing style (book-to-market equity), 
share repurchases manipulate book value which can cause “value” companies to be 
viewed by the model as “growth” companies because of the reduced book equity. High 
volumes of share repurchases lower the book value.  Indeed, the model becomes 
irrelevant if companies repurchases shares and take recorded book value to negative. In 
the S&P 500, 23 stocks have negative book value (S&P, 2021). These stocks will be 
eliminated from the portfolios necessary to create the factors. The negative book value 
list is dominated by value, retail-based companies with low growth prospects. They 
generate significant cash and have extensive undervalued real estate holdings on their 
balance sheets (companies like McDonald's, Starbucks, and Home Depot) and are not the 
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"financial distressed" companies that Fama and French eliminated (Fama & French, 
1993). While this hurts the "n" related to creating the factors, the companies that buy 
back significant quantities of shares and maintain a "near" zero book value are mislabeled 
in the Fama-French factor. This study's results did not find a consistent improvement in 
the R2 in any hypothesized treatments. However, instances of improved results suggest 
that the book value manipulation of share repurchases affects the HML factor's ability to 
explain returns in all cases. As share repurchases continue to grow, especially considering 
the near-zero cost of borrowings and the acceptance by the market of negative 
shareholder's equity, the quantitative approach of proxying value and growth will likely 
continue to get worse. However, this research was unable to find a silver bullet to find 
consistent improvement in the metric. 
 Due to the 30% and 70% breakpoints in HML, many of the manipulations 
changed a company's book value, but did not change their style portfolio. The "error" of 
labeling value stocks as growth stocks did not dominate the changes in the style 
portfolios. Since all manipulations would have only increased book value, negative book 
value companies could go into any of the three portfolios (growth, neutral, or value). 
Growth stocks (low book-to-market) could be moved into the neutral or value portfolios. 
Neutral stocks could tip over into value. Finally, value stocks would not move portfolios 
despite the adjustment.  
Therefore, if the majority of the "error" was value stocks masquerading as growth 
stocks, we should observe the changes in book value, thus increasing the number of high 
book to market (value) stocks and reducing the number of growth (low book to market 
companies). However, the dominating move was bringing more companies into the 
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sample set across the spectrum of all styles. As shown in Table 33, the percentage of 
stocks in each portfolio is not consistently changing, partially due to the breakpoints' 
moving target.  
 
H1: Return of Capital 
 The traditional accounting method suggesting that repurchased shares are a 
permanent return of capital is a struggle for practitioners to accept. Despite nearly 90% of 
firms in the S&P 500 having active repurchase programs in 2019, weighted average share 
counts have increased every other year for the last 20 years (Bloomberg, 2020b). There 
appears to be nothing permanent about the return of capital – with acquisitions being the 
Table 33: Percent of observations in HML style portfolios
1994-1999 High Medium Low 2009-2014 High Medium Low
H1 36.3% 33.4% 30.3% H1 39.3% 33.0% 27.7%
H2 36.4% 33.3% 30.3% H2 39.7% 32.9% 27.5%
H3 36.5% 33.2% 30.3% H3 38.9% 30.1% 31.0%
H4 35.8% 33.6% 30.6% H4 42.8% 31.7% 25.4%
H5 39.4% 32.9% 27.8%
1999-2004 High Medium Low
H1 39.4% 33.9% 26.8% 2014-2019 High Medium Low
H2 39.5% 33.6% 27.0% H1 37.3% 35.3% 27.4%
H3 39.1% 32.4% 28.6% H2 37.5% 35.0% 27.6%
H4 38.8% 34.9% 26.3% H3 34.5% 34.0% 31.5%
H4 40.2% 34.0% 25.7%
2004-2009 High Medium Low H5 37.3% 35.0% 27.8%
H1 33.7% 35.8% 30.5%
H2 33.9% 35.8% 30.4%
H3 31.8% 33.4% 34.8%
H4 36.8% 36.0% 27.2%
H5* 27.6% 35.4% 27.6%
*Data from 2005-2009 when the sample set for H5 begins
Style portfolios were created as high (top 30% of book equity to market equity), medium 
(middle 40% of book equity to market equity) and low (bottom 30% of book equity to 
market equity).  
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primary reason for the increases, followed by stock compensation. Nevertheless, it has 
some significant advantages. This form of accounting can be applied to both treasury and 
retired shares with equal impact; it is reliable, objective, and verifiable; finally, there is 
no use of estimates in the figures. In today's world of financial engineering, firms have 
taken share buybacks to the extreme, returning capital that was never recorded (resulting 
in negative book value). The billions of dollars used in this form of shareholder returns 
have attracted political attention.  For example, Senators Elizabeth Warren and Bernie 
Sanders have advocated banning or significantly curtailing the activity. 
 Surprisingly, despite the practical problems with the accounting method, the 
manipulation has not gotten to a point where it has impaired the distinction of value vs. 
growth in the Fama-French 3 -Factor model. The replication of the original methodology 
resulted in either higher or statistically similar explanatory results each time compared to 
a diversified portfolio.  
 Brick-and-mortar retail is a mature industry that has seen large share repurchases. 
Retail stocks account for about half of the 23 negative shareholder equity firms in the 
S&P 500.  This industry becomes a sample of convenience for examining the philosophy 
behind accounting for share repurchases. Of course, the artificially small accounting 
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H2: Stock Option Evidence 
 Due to data limitations, this study only uses stock options for its equity-based 
compensation hypothesis. However, over time, stock options have become less relevant. 
Sammer (2014) explained stock options as a form of performance-based compensation 
have declined in popularity over time, overtaken by whole share forms like restricted 
stock and performance-based stock. Bonaimé, Kahle, Moore, and Nemani (2020) hand-
collected data to show the drop in stock options and rise in whole-share compensation 
units, as shown in Figure 1. As the logic applied to stock options (share repurchases are 
used as a tool to offset compensation-based issuance) extends to whole-share costs, these 
should have been incorporated into the analysis in the ideal case. Based on the impact of 
the number of shares awarded, this study likely under-counted the impact of pre-paid 
stock compensation expense by more than half. Consequently, significant limitations 
were placed upon the information, to be gained by the value of the adjustment.   
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Figure 1: Stock-based compensation grants collected by Bonaime, Kahle, Moore, 
and Nemani (2020, p. 40) 
 "Annual average restricted stock and option grants, scaled by the number of 
shares outstanding, from 1994 to 2012 for our sample of 1,000 firms (Bonamie et al., 
2020, p.40)." 
 
Differentiated results of this adjustment were almost non-existent. Young 
technology companies tend to be the most generous with stock-based compensation, but 
due to their insatiable need for cash to fuel growth, they are also the least likely to 
repurchase shares. More mature companies use share repurchases to fund stock options 
and restricted stock grants. However, the difference, likely more than cut in half, was not 
so significant as to easily force a low book-to-market ratio stock to become a high book-
to-market stock. Consequently, while H2 was not supported, the question lingers, 
nevertheless. Accounting for the repurchase of shares and the issuance of those shares for 
compensation continues to be disconnected.  
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H3: Internally Generated Goodwill 
 Return on equity is designed to help measure a company's capital allocation 
decisions. However, excessive share repurchases and the disconnect between historical 
value-based and market-value-based assessments have allowed companies to register a 
"return of capital" of capital it never recorded. Recording the repurchase of shares as a 
return of capital at market value lowers the book value of the remaining shares and 
distorts capital allocation assessment. As a result, users of financial data often turn to 
"invested capital" or "tangible invested capital" to assess a company's use of resources. 
Nevertheless, if a company uses the same cash to buy the shares of a separate legal entity, 
it gets to recognize the difference between the book value and the market value of the 
assets acquired as goodwill. The internally generated goodwill hypothesis attempts to 
level these two similar transactions and leaves a permanent record (rather than one 
hidden through the selective retirement of shares) for users of the financial statements to 
assess management's capital allocation decisions.  
 While the internally generated goodwill was not a universal improvement over the 
traditional Fama-French model, this treatment showed a stronger (i.e., less than 0.001) 
difference in ∆R2 in portfolios with a low market-to-book ratio. This is evidence that 
some value stocks are tainting the growth stock portfolios. One commonly accepted 
definition of "growth stocks" is firms whose growth opportunities outweigh their ability 
to generate funding internally. In other words, growth stocks are a consumer of capital, 
not a generator of it. Companies labeled traditionally as growth stocks tend to be in 
markets like technology, financial services, and business services where the physical 
asset bases shown on the balance sheet (and reflected in book value) are much smaller 
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than the company's market value. This would suggest these types of companies would 
likely show a significant change in their book values if internally generated goodwill is 
capitalized. However, since the mechanism employed in this study is share repurchases, 
and growth companies have greater demands on their capital than the repurchasing of 
shares, most will remain low book-to-market companies. The slight improvement in the 
explanatory power of the adjusted Fama French model for growth portfolios suggests that 
some value companies may have been masquerading as growth before the adjustment. 
The internally generated goodwill adjustment had a higher R2 from 2014-2019 for 19 of 
the 30 industries versus the original Fama-French treatment. However, its improvement 
was typically slight. The most significant improvements can be seen in the Business 
Equipment and Services industries – both of which house technology-based growth 
stocks.  
Interestingly, this adjustment performs significantly worse in the same fields 
where the Cash Value of Repurchased Shares works much better (and vice versa). 
Returning to the example of the Business Equipment and Services industries, while the 
internally generated goodwill treatment results in the highest R2 for the 2014-2019 
period, the cash value of repurchased shares drops significantly. Moreover, it is not 
statistically significant in the Business Equipment field and only significant in the 
Services industry for p<.05. This suggests that it is the capture of goodwill and not the 
full dollar value of money spent that is lending strength to the explanatory power of the 
model. On the flip side, the Health industry is better explained by the cash-value of 
acquisitions than the internally generated goodwill treatment, with a 76.2% R2 for the 
cash value and a 69.1% R2 for the goodwill treatment. This is solid evidence that the 
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market is more nuanced in its beliefs than a single accounting treatment for share 
repurchases would suggest. In other words, the market does not necessarily treat 
repurchased shares as a permanent return of capital.  
H4: Cash Acquisition Asset 
 GAAP treatment of repurchased shares was debated well into the 1970s. The 
current return of capital method treatment of share repurchases was rapidly adopted when 
the IRS proposed taxing companies on gains from buying back and subsequently re-
issuing their own stock.  By treating it as a return of capital, and its subsequent re-issue as 
a new capital raise, no taxes were incurred (Horwitz & Young, 1975). The current 
method completely ignores future use. However, treasury shares are routinely re-issued 
for compensation and acquisition. Jenkins & Ovtchinnikov (2010) found that when a 
company used treasury stock to make an acquisition, the market reaction was similar to 
cash-based rather than newly issued share-based acquisitions. An argument can be made 
that, although fungible, the market perceived the treasury stock as worth more than the 
newly issue stock because a concreate financial transaction occurred to value the treasury 
stock, and management may have shown greater capital allocation discipline in line with 
Jensen's agency theorem (1986).  
 Results from this hypothesis were significantly worse overall. The market, for the 
most part, does not treat share repurchases as assets. However, there was one major 
exception. The “Health” industry had a significantly higher R2 than any other treatment 
from 2014-2019. This period in the Health industry was characterized by significant 
acquisitions coupled with relatively low repurchase activity (when compared to other 
sectors). Consequently, this result suggests that investors are willing to treat repurchased 
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shares as a temporary holding to be used later for acquisitions. A quick study of the 
health sector members of the S&P 500 showed that weighted average share counts 
increased in 46% of companies in the sector during the five years studied due to 
acquisition (Bloomberg, 2021b).  
H5: Put Option Hypothesis 
 With so many options available for the use of treasury shares, the recording of a 
put-option value as an asset would appear to be the logical compromise to all the 
aforementioned treatments of repurchased shares. It does not require any single use; 
retired shares would reduce the put option value; and it would be the closest estimate of 
the economic cost of repurchasing shares with the power to either benefit or punish 
managers for poor market timing. However, this hypothesis never improved explanatory 
value over the original Fama French model. Most of the time, the adjustment did not 
make a significant difference in the book value of companies. It may be because the 
adjustment is not big enough. To wit, approximately 20 companies represented more than 
half of the repurchased shares in 2018 and 2019 (S&P, 2020), suggesting any changes 
would have only affected relatively few observations. Additionally, this required the use 
of the "treasury stock" rather than "retirement" method of accounting – further reducing 
its impact. In the end, the adjustments were just too small to make a difference. While 
this alternative treatment of repurchased shares has the benefit of being able to be 
consistently applied and does not require an auditor to presume what a company would 
do with the shares, no evidence was found to support it.    
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Study Limitations 
 There are several potential limitations to this study. First, this study employed the 
Fama-French 3-Factor model to explain stock market returns. While this is a well-known 
and accepted method, the required division at the 30% and 70% breakpoints of the HML 
factor may not have been sensitive enough to detect the methodologies' differences. Like 
a residual income-based model, other models, where book value is a more sensitive input, 
may show different results. 
 Additionally, this study relied on CUSIP matching rather than CCM matching to 
create the Fama French factors. This reduced the "n" by a statistically significant amount. 
Using a more precise matching method may result in different results. 
 For the second hypothesis, this dissertation could only obtain information about 
stock options rather than all stock-based compensation. This likely reduced the impact of 
the adjustment by more than half its actual implication. Additionally, due to disclosure, 
stock options could not match with their repurchased shares each year they were issued 
but instead were clumped together at year-end pricing.  
 To optimally identify internally generated goodwill and the cash acquisition asset, 
the repurchased shares' timing would need to be more precise than this dissertation was 
able to do. While quarterly data of the amount and price paid for repurchased shares are 
available in 10-Ks and 10-Qs, this data was not available in CompStat. Consequently, this 
dissertation had to use a proxy of the average share price during the year and re-price the 
entire amount of treasury shares or eight years of net retired shares each year. In contrast, 
a multi-year approach would have reflected the projected treatment more accurately.  
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Future Studies 
Given the continued high explanatory ability of the unaltered Fama-French 3-Factor 
Model, we conclude that share repurchases have not yet impaired its ability to explain 
variabilities in returns. However, there is evidence that the model is missing some 
potential explanatory power. While the differences are usually relatively small over the 
entire sample set (1994-2019), the original Fama-French model had the highest 
explanatory power in 9 of the 30 industries, but that has dropped to 3 of 30 in the most 
recent five year period. It is possible that this study is too early in the cycle to see the 
ultimate deterioration of the Fama-French 3-Factor Model's explanatory power. 
One interesting implication that warrants future study is the SMB factor's 
improvement under several of the hypothesized treatments. This study often noted that 
total R2 remained steady or declined, but R2 for a two-factor model of just market beta 
and the SMB factor improved. This phenomenon may result from fewer "big" companies 
being excluded from the same set because of negative book value. A study separating the 
creation of the SMB and HML factors should be considered. 
Additionally, there may be alternative methods that are not subject to the account 
vagaries of share repurchases to isolate the growth vs. value stock returns that HML is 
supposed to proxy. Potential substitutions could be a Market Value to Enterprise Value 
approach or a free cash flow-based approach to identify nets users or generators of 
capital.  
The use of share repurchases has escalated far beyond the level when most of the 
research surrounding the signaling effects and market timing of the purchases was 
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conducted. Has management behavior and market reaction changed as share repurchases 
become ever more extensive?   
Finally, based on logic, recognizing a put-option value of repurchased shares would 
seem to be the most robust economic cost argument. This author could not find any 
evidence of this model in academic or practitioner literature and should be studied.  
Conclusion 
 Like many things, the answer to the fundamental question, “how does the market 
think about share repurchases?” is “it depends.” The market seems to recognize multiple 
reasons to repurchase and re-issue shares. It is more nuanced in its thinking than a blunt 
object like the Fama-French 3-Factor Model can tease out. However, the possible 
recognition of internally generated goodwill and the cash-like asset treatment of treasury 
shares may result in higher explanatory power as more and more companies leverage 
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